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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Damages-Income Tax as a Factor in Measuring Personal Injury
Awards
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 specifically excludes from gross
income "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agree-
ment) on account of personal injuries or sickness."'1 Rationally it would
seem that loss of earnings which are included in a personal injury award
should be taxable ;2 but since the code does not by its language exclude
any of the component parts of the award from the exemption it has been
presumed that this replacement of lost earnings is included.3
In personal injury litigation, income tax considerations give rise to at
least two distinct problems. The first is whether plaintiff's gross earnings
or net earnings (after taxes) prior to the injury should be the basis for
determining loss of past and future income in computing the amount of
the damages. The second problem is whether the jury may properly be
reminded in argument, or instructed by the court, that the final award is
not subejct to federal and state income tax.
In resolving the first problem the overwhelming weight of authority
is that the computations must be based on gross income, not net earnings
after income tax payments. The rationale of the cases is that the intro-
duction of the income tax consequences into the case would be too
conjectural and would tend to confuse rather than help the jury in de-
termining the proper amount of damage.4
England for many years was in accord with the American courts in
holding that no deduction for income tax liability should be made from
the amount awarded for loss of earnings.5 This authority has recently
SInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 104 (A) (2). This provision is broad enough to
cover damages for both impariment of earning capacity and past loss of earnings.
2 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 61 (A) as construed by Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426 (1955), includes as gross income any
receipt by the taxpayer that is not specifically excluded by the Code.
' Combs v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Ry. Co., 135 F. Supp.
750 (N. D. Iowa 1955). Another reason that has been given is that since the
verdict is general there is no way to determine the amount apportionable to loss
of earnings so the entire award in practice becomes tax free. See Pfister v. City of
Cleveland, 96 Ohio App. 185, 113 N. E. 2d 366 (1953).
'Rouse v. New York, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 349 Ill. App. 139, 110 N. E. 2d
266 (1953); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S. W. 2d 42 (1952);
Pfister v. City of Cleveland, 96 Ohio App. 185, 113 N. E. 2d 366 (1953) ; Smith v.
Pennsylvania Ry. Co., Ohio App., 99 N. E. 2d 501 (1950) ; Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co. v. Curl, 178 F. 2d 497 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Southern Pacific Co. ir. Guthrie, 186 F.
2d 926, 927 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Stokes v. United States, 144 F. 2d 82, 87 (2d Cir.
1944); Runnels v. City of Douglas, 124 F. Supp. 657 (D. C. Alaska 1954);
O'Donnell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 109 F. Supp. 590 (N. D. Cal. 1951) ; Cole v.
Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 443, 445 (4th Div. 1945).
aBillingham v. Hughes, (1949), 1 K. B. 643, 9 A. L. R. 311.
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been overruled by Transport Com. v. Gourley.6 Gourley, a civil engineer,
suffered severe injuries while traveling in a railway train operated by the
British Transport Commission. Liability being established, only the
quantum of damages remained to be ascertained. Apart from a provision
for pain and suffering, £37,720 was awarded for loss of earnings, of
which £15,220 was granted for actual loss of earnings before the trial and
£22,500 for estimated future loss of earnings. The judgment (for
£37,720 on account of loss of earnings) made no allowance for any income
tax or surtax which would have been payable by the plaintiff had he re-
ceived it in the ordinary course of his professional activities rather than by
way of damages. The counsel for the defendant requested that the
amount be reduced by the amount of tax plaintiff would have had to pay
if he had earned it, and the request was refused. On appeal the House of
Lords established the amount of unassessed income tax at £30,725 and
upheld the defendant's contention that this should be deducted.
The effect this case will have in the United States remains to be seen.T
The present English view appears to be unsound, at least within the
United States, because the assessment of damages on the basis set out
in the Gourley Case does not lend itself to practical application. Effective
tax rates in the United States fluctuate with the changing of the congress
and are governed by variables such as age, number of dependents, deduc-
tions, extent of the plaintiff's own private fortune, separate income of his
wife if he is married, etc.8 Also, ifi most jurisdictions there is no way
to determine what part of the award is attributable to loss of earnings
as was done in the above English case.
However, to allow no instruction at all as to the income tax con-
sequences may result in an excessive award to the plaintiff through a
misconception on the part of the jury that the award is taxable. This
leads to the second problem which is whether the jury should be told
that the final award is not subject to income tax.
In a recent case, Maus v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co.,9
the plaintiff brought an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act 0 against the defendant railroad for personal injuries sustained in the
course of his employment. The defendant requested the court to charge
the jury as follows: "I charge you as a matter of law that by virtue of
the Internal Revenue Act of 1954, any amount received by the plaintiff.
6 (1956) 3 All E. R. 796, 2 Weekly L. R. 41.
Many of the cases cited note 4 supra and note 12 inIra rely on Billingham v.
Hughes in following the view that income tax is of no consequence to the jury,
Is it possible that the Gourley decision may cause American courts to take a new
look at the problem.
' Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S. W. 2d 42 (1952), reversing Hilton.
v. Thompson, 360 Mo. 177, 227 S. W. 2d 675 (1950).
9 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N. E. 2d 253 (1956), affirming Ohio App., 128 N. E. .2d,
166 (1955).
1053 Stat. 1404 (1939) ; 45 U. S. C. § 51 (1953).
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as compensation for personal injury is exempt from federal income taxa-
tion, and you must take this fact into consideration in arriving at the
amount of your verdict in this case." The trial judge refused to give the
charge and he was affirmed on appeal. The court in holding that the
charge should not have been given to the jury based its decision on the
fact that taxation is not a proper factor for the jury to consider because
it introduces an extraneous subject giving rise to conjecture and specula-
tion."
At the time of this writing, thd courts of Arizona, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, Texas, and the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa have considered this question. Seven of the
eight jurisdictions held that it is improper to apprise the jury that the
final award is not subject to income tax.'2
In Dempsey v. Thompson,13 the leading case allowing such instruc-
tion, the plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries and the court
held that the defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed that any
amount awarded to the plaintiff was not subject to the income tax.14
The court said, "The present economic conditions are such that most
citizens, most jurors, are not only conscious of, but acutely sensitive to,
the impact of income taxes. Under the Federal and State income tax'
laws of Missouri the net income of all persons is taxable except such as
is specifically exempted. Few persons, other than those who have had
special occasion to learn otherwise, have any knowledge of the exemption
involved in this case. It is reasonable to assume the average juror would
believe the award involved in this case to be subject to such taxes. It
seems clear, therefore, that in order to avoid any harm such a misconcep-
tion could bring about, it would be competent and desirable to instrucf
the jury that an award of damages for personal injuries is not subject to
Federal or State income taxes."' 5
"But see the concurring opinion which states that a charge could be drawn
which if requested should be given by the trial judge.
"Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P. 2d 1034 (1956) ; Atlantic Coastline
Ry. Co. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 92 S. E. 2d 874 (1956); Hall v. Chicago &
North Western Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N. E. 2d 77 (1955), reversing 349 Ill.
App. 175, 110 N. E. 2d 77 (1955) ; Wagner v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 7 Ill. App.
2d 445, 129 N. E. 2d 771 (1955) ; Highshew v. Kushto (nd. Sup. Ct.), 134 N. E.
2d 555 (1956), reversing (nd. App.), 131 N. E. 2d 652 (1956) ; State v. Santry,
160 Ohio St. 164, 113 N. E. 2d-366 (1953) ; Mas v. New York, Chicago & St.
Louis Ry. Co., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N. E. 2d 253 (1956); Missner-Kansas-Texas
Ry. Co. v. McFerrin (Civ. App. Texas), 279 5. W. 2d 410 (1955); Combs v.Chicago, St. Paul, 'Minneapolis and Omaha Ry. Co., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N. D .
Iowa 1955). 
u 
"363 Mo. 339, 251 S. W. 2d 42 (1952), reversing Hilton v. Thompson, 360
Mo. 177, 227 S. W. 2d 675' (1950).
"t The court suggested a proper instruction which is as follows: "You are
instructed that any award made to plaintiff as damages in this case, if any award
is made, is not subject to federal and state income taxes, and you should not con-
sider such taxes in fixing the amonut of any award made to the plaintiff, if any
you make." Id., 346, 251 S. W. 2d at 45.
" Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 'S. W. 2d 42, 45 (1952).
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The purpose in awarding damages in personal injury litigation is to
make the injured party whole. This contemplates that the award for
damages received should place the injured person as nearly as possible in
the condition he would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred.'0
If we apply this principle, it follows that the jury should take the tax
element into consideration in respect to that portion of the recovery which
represents lost earnings, because if the person had not been injured tax
would have been paid on the wages received by him.
The principle that the purpose of a damage award is to make the
injured party whole is not applied by the majority of the courts, however,
when the plaintiff receives benefit from a collateral source. Thus, where
the plaintiff's actual damages are recouped in part by the payments of a
third party, such as continuance of wages by an employer while the
plaintiff is not at work,17 the tortfeasor's liability is not affected by the
amount conferred by the third party upon the injured person.18 By
analogy it would follow that the wrongdoer could not take advantage of
the windfall given the plaintiff by way of a tax benefit.'0 The tortfeasor
cannot be heard to complain of contracts or agreements between the
plaintiff and third parties which would tend to lessen the award if taken
into consideration. The defendant has no interest in whether the plaintiff
must pay the tax or not.
This problem has not as yet been presented to the North Carolina
Supreme Court. If and when this question is put before our court it is
suggested that the better holding is that the jury should not be told of
the income tax exemption. The majority of courts are apparently of
the view that the giving of such an instruction would, in general, not be
in the interest of better judical administration in that the injection of the
question of income tax liability into jury cases would probably give rise
to more problems than it would solve.2 0  North Carolina also follows the
view that the tortfeasor cannot take advantage of contracts and agree-
ments between the plaintiff and third parties which reduce his damage.2'
This would tend to indicate that no such charge should be allowed. 22
EDWIN T. PULLEN
"MCoRmici, DAMAGES § 137 (1935).
"717 Am. JuR., Damages § 200 (1938). See also Hammond v. Shiff, 100 N. C.
161, 6 S. E. 753 (1888) ; where the N. C. court held that collection of insurance
by the plaintiff did not mitigate defendant's damage.
"Majestic v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 147 F. 2d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 1945) ; 1
SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES § 158 (4th ed. 1916); McCoRMicK, DAMAGES § 87, 90(1935).
1" Hall v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N. E. 2d 77(1955); Combs v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Ry. Co., 135 F.
Supp. 750 (N. D. Iowa 1955).
'o See cases cited note 4 supra. 21 See case cited note 17 supra.22 
. C. GEN. STAT. 105-141 (2) exempts from gross income the amount of any
damages received on account of personal injuries. See also Sec. 105 (d) of the
Internal Revenue Code which in effect says that amounts received by an employee
under an employer-financed accident and health plan which constitute wages or
[Vol. 35
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Domestic Relations-Consent Judgments for Alimony-Subsequent
Modification and Enforcement by Contempt
It appears that in the area of consent judgments in North Carolina,
especially with respect to alimony decrees,1 the subtleties of the form of
the judgment play a major role in determining the subsequent rights of
the parties. A recent case2 serves notice of the unforseen consequences
that can result from a seemingly simple consent judgment involving
alimony and support for a wife and child. The decision seems3 to re-
iterate the general North Carolina rule that an award of alimony by
virtue of a consent judgment is not enforceable by contempt and is not
subject to modification without the consent of the parties.
It is a well-accepted rule that an alimony obligation pursuant to a
court degree is not a debt within the meaning of the usual constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt.4 Therefore, the husband can
be held in contempt for a wilful failure to comply with the decree. 5
However North Carolina has repeatedly held that consent judgments
based on agreement 6 of the parties do not rise to the dignity of an af-
firmative court decree so as to be enforceable by contempt.7 This gen-
payments in lieu of wages for a period during which the employee is absent from
work on account of personal injuries or sickness are excludable from gross income
to the extent of $100 a week. This is one example of the difficulty that would be
presented to a jury in determining the award in a personal injury action if they
were allowed to consider the tax aspects.
'This Note will deal primarily with consent judgments entered only with
respect to alimony decrees because the question of the propriety of contempt
proceedings arises most frequently here. Most other judgments for the payment of
money cannot be enforced by contempt proceedings because they are construed as
imposing a debt within the meaning of the usual constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt.2 Holden v. Holden, 245 N. C. 1, 95 S. E. 2d 118 (1956).
' The factual situation is complicated and it is not exactly clear on what basis
the court made its holding. The lower court altered a prior consent judgment
awarding alimony payments to the wife, and later the court held the husband in
contempt for failure to make the payments as specified in the altered decree. The
supreme court reversed; one of the grounds apparently was that the original order,
being a consent judgment, could not be modified nor enforced by contempt pro-
ceedings.
' Ex Parte Hall, 125 Ark. 309, 188 S. W. 827 (1916) ; Ex Parte Silvia, 123 Cal.
293, 55 Pac. 988 (1899) ; In re Popejoy, 26 Colo. 32, 55 Pac. 1083 (1899) ; Bronk
v. State, 43 Fla. 461, 31 So. 248 (1901) ; Heflinger v. Heflinger, 172 Ga. 889, 159
S. E. 242 (1931) ; Pain v. Pain, 80 N. C. 322 (1879) ; 17 Am. JUR., Divorce and
Separation § 666 (1938) ; Annot., 30 A. L. R. 130 (1924).5 In England even though a violation of an alimony decree is contempt of court
the person himself cannot be attached, however. De Lossy v. De Lossy (1890)
LR 15 Prob. Div. (Eng.) 115; 8 HALSBTURy, LAWS OF ENGLAND 22 (3d ed. 1954).
0 Prior to 1947 a consent judgment, being merely a contract between the parties,
was not valid to pass an interest in real property unless the privy examination of the
wife were taken. Ellis v. Ellis, 193 N. C. 216, 136 S. E. 350 (1927). In 1947 the
statute relating to contracts between husband and wife was amended to add the
present N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (d) (Supp. 1955) : "This section shall not apply
to any judgment of the superior court which, by reason of its being consented to
by a husband and his wife, or their attorneys, may be construed to constitute a
contract between such husband and wife."
Davis v. Davis, 213 N. C. 537, 196 S. E. 819 (1938) ; Webster v. Webster,
1957]
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eral rule was not applied in at least two earlier cases because the consent
judgment specified that the husband would be subject to contempt
proceedings on default, or the court in its decree reserved the right to
make further orders in the cause.
In Edmundson v. Edmundson8 the decree contained the following
proviso: "The money payments -provided herein shall be more than a
simple judgment for debt. They shall be as effectively binding upon
plaintiff [husband] as if rendered under and by virtue of the authority of
[G. S. § 50-16] ... and the failure of the plaintiff to make the payments
... shall ... subject him to such penalties as may be required by the
court, in case of contempt of its orders." The Supreme Court held
this sufficient to enable the lower court to hold the husband in contempt
for failure to comply with the decree. The judge in Dyer v. Dyer 0 stated
in the decree that by the consent of the parties the husband was to pay
wife a certain sum "pending further orders of this court."'" This was
held sufficient to create a definite decree of the court rather than a mere
sanction of the contract of the parties; the decree was therefore enforce-
able by contempt.
The position taken in the above two cases was recognized in Lentz v.
LentS.12 In a per curiam decision, the court decided there could be no
contempt proceeding under the particular consent judgment in issue,
saying: "There is no provision in the judgment in the present action
that leaves the matter open, or any provision giving the court discre-
tionary power .... -" Thus it appears that in order for the wife to hold
a. coercive hand over the husband's head it would be wise to request the
court to write in an express provision for contempt or to reserve future
powers of modification.
The principal case seems to be in line with previous North Carolina
decisions on this point because the lower court's decree contained no
language such as that in the Edmundson and Dyer decrees. The court
stated in the principal case: "The judgment merely sets out the payments
agreed upon for the support of the defendent [wife] . . . and the court
did not decree that the payments should be made by the plaintiff. 1 4
Thus the net effect is that the court has merely affirmed the agreement
of the parties and it will be enforceable as an ordinary contract.
213 N. C. 135, 195 S. E. 362 (1938); Lentz v. Lentz, 194 N. C. 673, 140 S. E.
440 (1927). N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-247 (1953) was amended in 1947 to provide
that a judgment by confession enforceable by contempt could be entered for
alimony or for support of minor children. The purpose of the amendment is tohave a simplified method of converting an agreement between the parties into ajudgment enforceable by contempt. See Case Survey, 25 N. C. L. REV. 376, 389-
90 (1947) for a brief comment on this.
8222 N. C. 181, 22 S. E. 2d 576 (1942) ; Note, 21 N. C. L. REv. 307 (1943).
Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 182, 22 S. E. 2d 576, 578 (1942).
'°212 N. C. 620, 194 S. E. 278 (1937). " Id. at 621, 194 S. E. at 279.
"194 N. C. 673, 140 S. E. 440 (1927). " Id. at 674, 140 S. E. at 440.
"Holden v. Holden, 245 N. C. 1, 6, 95 S. E. 2d 118. 122 (1956).
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North Carolina seems to be in the minority concerning the effect of
a consent judgment from the standpoint of enforceability. Most juris-
dictions hold that once the agreement of the parties is incorporated into
the court decree,' 5 or is simply restated in the form of a decree,16 the
contract is superseded by the court order and it has the full force and
effect of a decree enforceable by contempt. The fact that the decree con-
sists entirely of the parties' agreement, without further orders from the
court, does not appear to preclude enforceability by contempt proceedings.
However if the decree merely refers to the agreement and the terms
of the agreement are not actually set out in the decree, it is still a contract
and not enforceable by contempt."7
Another consequence of holding the court order to be a mere approval
of the agreement of the parties and not a court decree is that it cannot
be modified without the consent of the parties unless it was unfair to the
wife or was obtained by fraud or mutual mistake. This is in line with
many previous North Carolina decisions concerning consent judgments,
not only in divorce and separation cases but also in other areas.' s
As a general rule an alimony decree, unless awarded in conjunction
with an absolute divorce, 19 can be modified on the application of either
5 Sessions v. Sessions, 178 Minn. 75, 226 N. W. 701 (1929); Karteus v.
Karteus, 67 N. D. 297, 272 N. W. 185 (1937); Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 153
S. E. 879 (1930); see Holloway v. Holloway, 130 Ohio St. 214, 216, 198 N. E.
579, 580 (1935) : "A decree which incorporates an agreement is a decree of court
nevertheless, and as soon as incorporated into the decree the separation agreement
is superseded by the decree, and the obligations imposed are not those imposed by
contract, but are those imposed by decree, and enforceable as such .... Where a
court, in its divorce decree, adopts the language of a separation agreement, it does
not thereby reduce the status of the decree to that of a mere contract. While a
contract may become a decree of court, a decree of court cannot assume the status
of a mere contract."
" Ex Parte Dukes, 155 Ark. 24, 243 S. W. 863 (1922) ; Cox v. Cox, 197 Ga.
260, 29 S. E. 2d 83 (1944) ; Estes v. Estes, 192 Ga. 94, 14 S. E. 2d 681 (1941) ;
Barrett v. Barrett, 287 Ky. 216, 152 S. W. 2d 610 (1941) ; Hargis v. Hargis, 252
Ky. 198, 66 S. W. 2d 59 (1933).
" Lazar v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 617, 620, 107 P. 2d 249, 250 (1940)
("If a property settlement agreement is complete in itself and is merely referred
to in a divorce decree or approved by the court but not actually made a part of the
decree, then the provisions of such agreement cannot be enforced by contempt
proceedings.") ; Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N. C. 129, 37 S. E. 2d 118 (1946) ; Brown
v. Brown, 224 N. C. 556, 31 S. E. 2d 529 (1944).
18 Spruill v. Nixon, 238 N. C. 523, 78 S. E. 2d 323 (1953) (easement); Lee v.
Rhodes, 227 N. C. 240, 41 S. E. 2d 747 (1947) (ejectment); King v. King, 225
N. C. 639, 35 S. E. 2d 893 (1945) (assumpsit) ; Keen v. Parker, 217 N. C. 378, 8
S. E. 2d 209 (1940) (ejectment) ; Weaver v. Hampton, 201 N. C. 798, 161 S. E
480 (1931) (action against county commissioners for corrupt refusal to perform
duties) ; Morris v. Patterson, 180 N. C. 484, 105 S. E. 2d 25 (1920) (separation
agreement).
" If the alimony is decreed pursuant to an absolute divorce, the general rule is
that it cannot be subsequently modified. Kenard v. Kenard, 131 Fla. 473, 179 So.
660 (1938) ; Hardy v. Pennington, 187 Ga. 523, 1 S. E. 2d 667 (1939) ; Duff v.
Duff, 275 Ky. 367, 121 S. W. 2d 933 (1938) ; Stewart v. Stewart, 127 Pa. Super.
567, 193 A t. 860 (1937). In North Carolina this problem will not arise because
there can be no permanent alimony granted in conjunction with an absolute
divorce. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1955), Duffy v. Duffy, 120 N. C. 346,
27 S. E. 28 (1897). But where there is a valid separation agreement followed by
1957]
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party according to their varying circumstances, 20 and this is true even
though there was no provision in the decree allowing for a modification. 21
However, the parties can make an agreement between themselves as to
a proper sum to be paid, subject to the approval of the court that it is
fair to the parties at the time it is made. This will be enforceable as a
contract 22 and will not be subject to modification without the consent
of the parties.2 3 But if the court renders an alimony decree which is
based upon,24 adopts, or incorporates2- an agreement entered into by the
parties, the general trend is to the effect that it can be modified.2 6 There
is a distinction between judgments based on the agreement of the parties
and consent judgments in the technical sense. The generally prevailing
rule, as in North Carolina, is that the latter cannot be modified,27 although
the former can be.
North Carolina follows a consistent pattern in saying consent judg-
an absolute divorce, the agreement stands and is enforceable as a contract. Jenkins
v. Jenkins, 225 N. C. 681, 36 S. E. 2d 233 (1945) ; Lentz v. Lentz, 193 N. C. 742,
138 S. E. 2d 12 (1927).
2 Robinson v. Robinson, 250 Ky. 488, 63 S. W. 2d 605 (1933); Weiner v.
Weiner, 242 App. Div. 847, 275 N. Y. Supp. 177 (2d Dep't 1934) ; Gloth v. Gloth,
154 Va. 511, 153 S. E. 879 (1930) ; Annot., 71 A. L. R. 700 (1931).
" Anderson v. Anderson, 124 Cal. 48, 56 Pac. 630, 57 Pac. 81 (1899) ; Sperry v.
Sperry, 80 W. Va. 142, 92 S. E. 574 (1917). As a general rule past due install-
ments are not subject to modification. COHEN, DIVORCE AND ALIMONY IN NORTH
CAROLINA 172 (1949). Therefore the past due installments can be enforced in a
foreign State. Barber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 77 (1944). But since future payments
are subject to modification by the court granting the decree, there will normally be
no judgment in a foreign State as to these future payments. Lynde v. Lynde, 181
U. S. 183 (1901).
2 The leading case of Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N. C. 408, 74 S. E. 327 (1912)
was the first acknowledgment by North Carolina that separation agreements entered
into between husband and wife were not against public policy, provided there were
certain safeguards for the protection of the wife and society.
2 Pryor v. Pryor, 88 Ark. 302, 114 S. W. 700 (1908) ; North v. North, 339
Mo. 1226, 100 S. W. 2d 582 (1936) ; Morris v. Patterson, 180 N. C. 484, 105 S. E.
25 (1920) ; Sinkler v. Sinkler, 49 N. D. 1144, 194 N. W. 817 (1923) ; Buckminster
v. Buckminster, 38 Vt. 248, 88 Am. Dec. 652 (1865).
2 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935) ; Briggs v. Briggs, 178 Ore. 193, 165
P. 2d 772 (1946) ; Annot., 166 A. L. R. 666 (1947).
2 Worthington v. Worthington, 224 Ala. 237, 139 So. 334 (1932) ; Warren v.
Warren, 116 Minn. 458, 133 N. W. 1009 (1912) ; Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605,
160 P. 2d 15 (1945).
26 There is a recognized split as to whether alimony decrees based on agree-
ments are subject to modification. See KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 716 (3d
ed. 1946) ; Note, 44 HARv. L. REV. 127 (1930) ; Note, 27 ORE. L. REV. 130 (1948).
The reason usually given for allowing a modification is that as the court has the
duty to grant alimony it is not bound by the agreement of the parties concerning
the amount to be awarded; consequently, the agreement cannot hinder the court
from modifying the decree. Cf. Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d 929 (2d Cir.
1946).
Occasionally a distinction is made that if the judgment orders payment of some-
thing other than alimony in the technical sense of the word, it will be enforceable
as a contract between the parties rather than as an obligation arising out of the
marital relationship. Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 Atl. 488 (1929)
Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 Atl. 387 (1928).
2" Keach v. Keach, 217 Ky. 723, 290 S. W. 708 (1927) ; Karnes v. Black, 185
Ky. 410, 215 S. W. 191 (1919) ; McArthur v. Thompson, 140 Neb. 408, 299 N. W.
519 (1941) ; Brady v. Hyman, Tex. Civ. App., 230 S. W. 2d 342 (1950).
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ments can neither be modified nor enforced by contempt, whereas the
majority rules refuse modification but allow contempt proceedings. It
is submitted that as to contempt the majority is the better view; otherwise
the judgment is of no practical value to the wife other than as a judicial
affirmation of the contract existing between the parties. She would be
as well off without the decree because she can enforce it only by the usual
methods of enforcing contracts. By'the same token, it is thought that
the minority view as to modification is preferable. If a judge with veto
power over the terms of the agreement approves them and sets them out
in the decree, this should be sufficient adoption of the terms to make
them a part of the decree.
In view of the distinction made in North Carolina between consent
judgments and ordinary alimony decrees, however, it is advisable that
the attorney carefully word the form of the judgment so as to preserve
in the court further rights in the cause. As seen in the Edmiundson and
Dyer cases, the subsequent rights of the parties are materially affected by
the technical form of the judgment.
HAMLIN WADE
Domestic Relations-Consequences of a Voidable Divorce Decree
In the recent case of Harmon v. Harmon,' the husband, after obtain-
ing a decree of absoulte divorce on grounds of two years separation, re-
married. Thereafter, the first wife was successful in her motion in the
cause to have the divorce decree set aside, because the clerk of court had
not mailed to her a copy of the notice of service by publication as
required by statute2 The trial judge gave an order vacating the decree,
but did not dismiss the action and ordered the clerk to make proper
service of process on the defendant wife. Upon proper service of
process, the wife filed her answer setting up as a defense to the divorce
action the cohabitation arising out of the second marriage as adulterous
and therefore a bar to her husband's action. The Supreme Court
rejected the wife's contention and affirmed the divorce decree. The
court stated that since the husband had done all that was required of him
by law and there was no evidence of any intentional wrong or fraud on
his part in the procurement of the divorce decree, his cohabitation with
the second wife up to the time he knew the decree would be set aside was
not adulterous so as to bar his right of action.
This appears to be the first case in which the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has considered the effect of an error in the procedure of
service of process by publication pursuant to N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-99.2
1245 N. C. 83, 95 S. E. 2d 355 (1956).
2 N. C. GaN. STAT. § 1-992(c) (1953): "The clerk shall mail a copy of the
notice of service of process by publication to each party whose name and residence
or place of business appear in the verified pleading or complaint. ... "
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(c) as amended in 1 953 .3 The statute now requires the clerk of court
to mail a copy of the notice of service by publication, within five days
after the issuance of the order for service, to each party whose name and
address appear in the verified pleading or sworn affidavit filed pursuant
to N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-99.4. Prior to the 1953 amendment, the clerk
of court, was not required to mail such copies. The court overlooked
or thought not .significant that portion of § 1-99.2(c), which requires the
,l rc, to make-a record of mailings in accordance with N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 2-42. If the 'clerk must make a record of these filings, it seems
-reasonable that the" court, would have required the plaintiff to have
checked the records to see if it showed a proper mailing before he was
relieved of the consequences of a subsequent marriage. However, the
court apparently did not consider that a legal duty of the plaintiff.
The Harmon case illustrates'that it may not be wise to use the first
alternative authorized under N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-994 for service of
process where 'the defendant is out "of state but his address is known.
To do so may subject the plaintiff to! the same. danger involved in the
.Harmon case through no fault of his own. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-99
states a second alternative in subsection (2), which would be safer to
use if the foreign address of the defendant is known. Subsection (2)
provides that if this alternative is taken, the procedure set out in the N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-1045 must be followed. Since under this alternative the
court will take jurisdiction only upon return of the statutory certificate,
the chances of a court taking jurisdiction when in fact there has been no
valid service is greatly reduced.
The Harmon case appears also to be the first case in which the
Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether marriage under
the belief of a valid divorce constitutes adulterous cohabitation so as to
bar another divorce action, when the first divorce decree was not valid
and was later vacated. The decision is in accord with the weight of
authority in this country.0
Note also that the court gave as one of its reasons for not finding the
See Note, 31 N. C. L. REv. 391 (1953) for the changes brought about in the
procedure of service of process by the 1953 amendments.
, "If the verified pleading or affidavit conforms to the requirements of G. S.
1-98.4, and if it appears to the satisfaction of the judge or clerk that the person
to be served cannot, after due diligence, be found in the State, the judge or clerk
shall, at the election of the plaintiff, either (1) Make an order for service of
process by publication of the notice provided for in G. S. 1-99.2 once a week for
four successive weeks in a designated newspaper . . . (2) Make an order for
service of process outside the State pursuant to G. S. 1-104."
'This statute provides that it shall be sufficient for service of process outside
the state to mail the original and a copy of the process together with a copy of such
pleading or affidavit to the sheriff or other process officer of the county or
corresponding governmental subdivision of the state where the party to be
served is located, who shall serve the same and make his return using a form as set
out in G. S. § 1-104(b).627 C. J. S., Divorce § 56(b) (3) (1941).
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cohabitation resulting from the second marriage adulterous the fact that
the husband separated from the second wife immediately upon being
advised by the court that the wife's motion to vacate the divorce decree
would be granted. This may infer that the court agrees-with the rule
that cohabitation pursuant to the second marriage after the divorce
decree has been vacated constitutes adultery, even though the second
marriage was contracted in reliance on the validity of the decree." How-
ever, the Supreme Court did not have to state what consideration will
be given to a lapse of time in moving to have the divorce decree vacated
or the intervention of innocent third 15.arties in setting aside the decree.
The question whether the court ought to vacate or set aside a divorce
decree after the remarriage of one of the parties necessarily depends upon
the facts of the particular case, and the decision rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court. This view is supported by some cases.8
The Harmon case apparently is in accord. However, some courts have
indicated that where the plaintiff has remarried and there has been a
delay in seeking to vacate the decree, the courts will take into considera-
tion the public policy to prevent bastardizing children of the second
marriage and also the resulting injury to the innocent second wife,Iespecially where there has been no fraud or bad faith on the part of the
remarrying spouse and the-marriage is on the faith of the divorce decree.9
This matter of public policy takes on more significance when one con-
siders the general rule that upon a decree of divorce being annulled or
vacated, the marital rights, obligations and status of the parties are
revived and restored to the status in which they were before the divorce,
irrespective of a subsequent marriage or the birth of children by the
second marriage.10 So under such a rule it does harm to the innocent
second spouse and bastardizes the children of the subsequent marriage.11
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in the recent case of Patrick v.
Patrick12 has shown that it will not consider the lapse of time when the
' State v. Whitcomb, 52 Iowa 85, 2 N. W. 970 (1879) ; State v. Watson, 20
R. I. 354, 39 Atl. 193 (1898).
v See Johnson v. Johnson, 81 Cal. App. 2d 686, 185 P. 2d 49 (1947) ; Leathers
v. Stewart, 108 Me. 96, 79 Atl. 16 (1911) ; Hall v. Hall, 70 Mont. 460, 226 P.
469 (1924) ; Paynton v. Paynton, 194 Mich. 504, 160 N. W. 837 (1916).
Bussey v. Bussey, 95 N. H. 349, 64 A. 2d 4 (1949) ; Karren v. Karren, 25
Utah 187, 69 P. 465 (1902).
10 17 Am. JurR, Divorce and Separation § 463 (1938), which cited Gato v.
Christian, 112 Me. 427, 92 Atl. 489 (1914) ; McKee v. Bevins, 138 Tenn. 249, 197
S. W. 563 (1917).
" If North Carolina follows this general rule, it would appear that the plaintiff
and his second wife are no longer validly married even though the plaintiff is now
validly divorced. But see Taylor v. White, 160 N. C. 38, 75 S. E. 941 (1912).
12245 N. C. 195, 95 S. E. 2d 585 (1956). In the Patrick case, the plaintiff wife
had obtained an absolute divorce on grounds of 5 years' separation in 1929 upon
service by publication in accordance with the law then in effect. Subsequent
thereto the husband lived with and supported the wife until her death and kept him
in ignorance of such decree. Upon being appointed personal administrator of her
estate, the husband acquired knowledge of such decree and made a motion in the
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the plaintiff was guilty of some fraud. This case, however, does not
settle the question whether the delay in time would have been considered
if there had been no fraud by the plaintiff and a subsequent marriage to
another after the decree.
The only intervening factor in the Harmon case which might have
prevented the court from granting the vacation of the decree was the
remarriage by the plaintiff husband to an innocent third person. The
court apparently adopted the rule that the marriage is not itself a suf-
ficient reason for refusing to vacate or set aside the decree. This is al-
most universally held by other jurisdictions.'3 Some courts, however,
state that great caution should be exercised before it vacates or sets aside
a divorce decree where one of the parties has married again. 14 The
other extreme from the majority view is the rule in Kentucky that the
court cannot vacate a decree of divorce, even though the motion to vacate
is made during the term at which the decree was entered, if either of
the parties has married, provided there was no fraudulent acts by the
successful party.15 This problem is handled in a unique way in New
York. Where a defaulting defendant in a divorce case seeks to have
the judgment or decree set aside so that he may defend on the merits,
the trial court's order permits the defense but allows the judgment of
divorce to stand until the trial of the issues in the divorce action, with
a proviso that if the defense is sustained the judgment should be set
aside; but if the defendant is unsuccessful the judgment should remain
in full force.16 If the Supreme Court of North Carolina adopted either
the Kentucky or New York rule, it would be clear that the plaintiff in
the Harmon case is still married to his second wife.
The Harmon situation raises the problem of whether the plaintiff
husband may be guilty of bigamy17 by his subsequent marriage. It is
usually held that the fact that one charged with bigamy believed in good
faith that he had been lawfully divorced from his first wife constitutes no
cause to have it vacated, which the trial court granted and the Supreme Court of
North Carolina affirmed. The court vacated the divorce decree on the grounds
that the wife by means of false allegations contained in her complaint perpetrated
a fraud upon the court thereby causing the court to assume jurisdiction.
Murphy v. Murphy, 200 Ark. 458, 140 S. W. 2d 416 (1940) ; Nelson v. Nelson,
7 Cal. 2d 449, 60 P. 2d 982 (1936) ; Croyle v. Croyle, 184 Md. 126, 40 A. 2d 374
(1944) ; Zirkalos v. Zirkalos, 326 Mich. 420, 40 N. W. 2d 313 (1949) ; Meyers v.
Meyers, 200 Okla. 683, 199 P. 2d 819 (1948) ; Tarr v. Tarr, 184 Va. 443, 35 S. E.
2d 401 (1945).
"4 Day v. Nothingham, 160 Ind. 408, 66 N. E. 998 (1903) ; Bussey v. Bussey,
95 N. H. 349, 64 A. 2d 4 (1949) ; Walker v. Walker, 151 Wash. 480, 276 P. 300
(1929).
" Moran v. Moran, 281 Ky. 739, 137 S. W. 2d 418 (1940) ; Bushong v. Bushong,
283 Ky. 36, 140 S. W. 2d 610 (1940).
'o Fuchs v. Fuchs, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 487 (1946).
'
7 See N. C. GEN. STAr. § 14-183 (1953).
Witt v. State, 5 Ala. App. 137, 59 So. 715 (1912) ; People v. Hartman, 130
Cal. 487, 62 Pac. 823 (1900) ; State v. Long, 44 Del. 251, 59 A. 2d 545 (1948) ; Jack-
son v. State, 21 Ga. App. 823, 95 S. E. 631 (1918) ; State v. Najjar, 1 N. J. Super.
208, 63 A. 2d 807 (1949).
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defense.18 Some of the cases have stated that the bigamy statutes do
not require any intent and that the statute puts on the defendant the duty
to be absolutely sure that his divorce decree was valid before contracting
such marriage and if he does not do so, it is a crime in the public
interest. 19  The court of Arkansas in a similar situation" to the one
in the Harmon case held that even a certificate by a clerk of court of a
decree of divorce is insufficient where the divorce decree was really void.
The probability of bigamy is strengthened by the fact that the Supreme
Court in the Harmon case cited Chisholm v. Chisholm,21 a Florida case,
in which the wife, after obtaining a divorce decree, married and cohabited
with another, but separated from the second husband before her first
husband obtained a vacation of the original decree. The court held that
her cohabitation with her second husband may technically be regarded
as bigamy but did not constitute adultery such as would preclude her
from obtaining a divorce. Although the court was talking of different
things, there is some basis for the inference that the Supreme Court of
North Carolina might hold that the defendant could be guilty of bigamy,
but not of adultery so as to bar his divorce action. In State v. Nichols,
22
the Supreme Court held that evidence that the defendant had employed
a lawyer to obtain a divorce from his first wife and had been informed
that it would require about thirty days to do so, and that he had waited
thirty days and then married the second wife, believing he was divorced,
was properly excluded. It has also been held apparently without ex-
ception in North Carolina that a bona fide belief in the invalidity of a
first marriage is not a defense to a prosecution for bigamy when in fact
that marriage was valid and subsisting 3 Following this reasoning the
plaintiff would be guilty of bigamy. It has also been held that when the
statute fixes the exceptions, the courts cannot extend it.24  Since the
North Carolina statute for bigamy lists the exceptions 25 and the Harmon
situation is not within the statutory list, it would follow that the husband
would be guilty of bigamy.
However, there are cases in this country holding that an honest but
erroneous belief, reasonably entertained, that a valid divorce has been
granted will constitute a defense to a prosecution for bigamy.26 The
See footnote 17 supra.0 Russell v. State, 66 Ark. 185, 49 S. W. 821 (1899).2 Chisholm v. Chisholm, 105 Fla. 402, 141 So. 302 (1932).
22241 N. C. 615, 86 S. E. 2d 202 (1955).
23 State v. Robbins, 28 N. C. 23 (1845) ; State v. Williams, 220 N. C. 445, 17
S. E. 2d 769 (1941).
"' State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 P. 802 (1896) ; State v. Hendrickson, 67
Utah 15, 245 P. 375 (1926).2 See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-183 (1953).
2Robinson v. State, 6 Ga. App. 696, 65 S. E. 792 (1909) ; Lesueur v. State,
176 Ind. 448, 95 N. E. 239 (1911); State v. Sparacino, 164 La. 704, 114 So. 601
(1927) ; Turner v. State, 212 Miss. 590, 55 So. 2d 228 (1951) ; Baker v. State,
86 Neb. 775, 126 N. W. 300 (1910).
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court in the Harmon case cited with approval the quotation in State v.
Cutshall27 from Alonzo v. The State28 which explains the reason for
such a holding. That is, if one of the parties after exercising due care,
was mistaken as to a matter of fact which, had it been true, would have
rendered the alleged criminal act legal and innocent, the party so acting
under such mistake of fact would be innocent of crime. So there is some
basis for the inference that the Supreme Court might not find a person
in the situation of the husband in the Harmon case guilty of bigamy. It
certainly seems that this rule is the more logical and reasonable. To
prosecute a man for bigamy who has done all that is legally required to
get a valid divorce, and is acting in reliance upon an order of the court
granting the divorce at the time he remarries, is not reasonable or just.
It seems that a person who has acted in good faith should be entitled to
rely upon a supposedly valid divorce decree without fear of criminal
prosecution.%PARxs ALLEN ROBERTS
Execution-Supplemental Proceedings or Creditor's Bill in North
Carolina
Under the dual system of courts of law and equity that existed in
North Carolina prior to 1868, the judgment creditor had to resort to his
bill in equity' to reach property of the judgment debtor that was not
liable to execution at law. All the debtor's property was liable for his
debts excelit his legal exemptions.2 But only legal interests in tangible
personalty and realty, equities of redemption, and interests under a pas-
sive trust could be reached by execution at law.8 Legal interests in in-
tangibles and equitable interests other than those pointed out above had
to be reached by a creditor's bill in equity. The remedy in equity was
not available to a creditor who had not exhausted his legal remedies. 4
In 1868, a statutory procedure known as supplemental proceedings
was adopted whereby the judgment creditor could subject to sale certain
of the judgment debtor's property which could not be reached under
execution at law.5 . Although ' ostensibly this statute was intended to
completely replace the creditor's bill, the question arose as to whether
109 N. C. 764, 14 S. E. 107 (1891).
'15 Tex. App. 378 (1910). ..
'Also called creditor's suit, creditor's bill, and judgment creditor's bill' (to
distinguish it from general creditor's bills with which we are not here concerned).
Since the fusion of courts of law and equity, the courts frequently call thi§
proceeding an action.2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-369 et seq. (1953).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-315 lists property that is subject to levy and sale under
execution. Here we are concerned only with property not so subject.
'Wheeler v. Taylor, 41 N. C. 225 (1849).




it excluded a creditor's bill entirely or whether either could be used at
the creditor's option.
In McKeithan v. Walker6 it was held that supplemental proceedings
could not be used but a creditor's bill was necessary to subject the
judgment debtor's interest in a resulting trust in land to the satisfaction
of his debt. In that case the judgment debtor, prior to the institution
of the action in which the judgment was recovered, transferred land to
one Brown under a deed of trust to secure certain debts. The judgment
was docketed and an execution issued and returned unsatisfied. Then,
by supplemental proceedings, the plaintiffs, judgment creditors, obtained
an order for the examination of Brown. Finding that he held the land of
the judgment debtor under the deed of trust, the plaintiffs asked for a
decree to require the trustee to sell the land held in trust and after paying
the debts and costs provided for in the deed of trust, to pay the surplus
to plaintiffs on their executions. In holding that the interest of the
judgment debtor could not be reached by supplemental proceedings but
only by an action in the nature of the former creditor's bill in equity, the
Court, after concluding that the debtor's interest in the resulting trust
was subject to the lien of the docketed judgment under N. C. GE. STAT.
§ 1-234, said: "We think the purpose of the Code was to give those
remedies [supplemental proceedings] to a plaintiff only in case the de-
fendant had no known property liable to execution, or to what is in the
nature of execution, viz: Proceedings to enforce its sale for the satisfai-
tion of the debt, sufficient in value to satisfy the debt .... If there be
a lien on property, it must be shown either by a sale of the property or
by affidavit that the property is insufficient in value to satisfy the debt."'
In Rand v. Rand,8 the Court used very strong language to the effect
that the bill in equity was abolished and that a judgment creditor's only
remedy was by supplemental proceedings. 9 The McKeithan case was
then considered and the Court concluded that if the decision in that case
was the proper construction of the Code in respect to cases where sup-
plemental proceedings would not lie and the party would have to resort
866 N. C. 95 (1872).
Id. at 98. 878 N. C. 12 (1878).
o "If we clearly ascertain what is a 'supplementary proceeding' as established.
by our Code, its scope and end, we shall have done much to settle the present and
similar questions of jurisdiction. We think it clear that proceedings supplementary
to execution under the Code of Procedure are a substitute for the former creditor's
bill. . . . The only purpose of the creditor's bill was to enforce satisfaction of a
judgment out of the property of the judgment debtor when an execution could not.
reach it, and the only purpose of supplementary proceedings is to obtain the same.
ends by the same means. The bill in equity has been abolished and nothing is
substituted in its place but the proceedings supplemental to the execution and in-aid,
of it. The office -%f the former is now performed by-the latter, and it would be
inadequate, and the parties would be in many cases without remedy, unless it could
be applied in the same cases and to the same extent by taking hold on all the,
property and rights of the debtor out of the reach of an execution at law, and
applying them in discharge of the debt." Id. at 14.
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to a creditor's bill, then a creditor's bill would be necessary to reach the
judgment debtor's equitable interest in real estate, 10 whereas supple-
mental proceedings were proper to reach a like interest in personal
property. The Court intimated disapproval of the distinction drawn in
its interpretation of the decision in McKeithan v. Walker but did not
disapprove it expressly. The holding of the Rand case in which the
judgment creditor sought to subject to the payment of the judgment a
distributive share of a personal estate in the hands of administrators to
which the judgment debtor was entitled, was that the creditor's bill
could not be maintained, but the plaintiff's only remedy was by supple-
mental proceedings."
The Rand interpretation of the McKeithan decision was spelled out
and followed in McCaskill v. Lancashire1 2 where the identical issue was
before the court. McKeithan v. Walker was followed in other cases
where the court required the judgment creditor who was seeking the aid
of supplemental proceedings, to show by affidavit or otherwise the non-
existence of any equitable estates in land within the lien of the judg-
ment.1
3
It is important to note that all the cases discussed above were decided
between 1868 and 1883 under the Code of Civil Procedure adopted in
1868. In the Code of 1883 there appeared some changes14 in the chapter
on Proceedings Supplementary to the Execution which were apparently
designed to abrogate the holdings of these cases. As far as pertinent to
"o Because the docketed judgment constituted a lien on equitable interests in real
property by the construction of N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-234.
" The plaintiff had started a new action in the same court in which she would
have had to start supplemental proceedings; the deviation from supplementary
proceedings was more in form than substance. The Court refused to dismiss the
action but allowed the plaintiff to amend as to form. This allowed the plaintiff
to keep the benefit of the restraining order on the administrators, one of whom
was the insolvent judgment debtor.
1 83 N. C. 393, 399 (1880). "The result of the cases, including the late case of
Rand v. Rand, 78 N. C. 12, is that judgment creditors must resort to supplementary
proceedings, as provided for in the Code, in all cases except the single one of ajudgment operating as a lien on equitable estates in land which cannot be sold on
execution, and may commence such proceedings even in that case upon affidavit of
the insufficiency of the property affected by the lien to pay the judgment; but
otherwise, the proceedings to enforce the lien of a judgment on equitable interests
in land not liable to execution under the act of 1812 must be by action in court,
and the proceeds applied, if sufficient, before the judgment debtor can be subjected
to supplementary proceedings. The line of distinction is distinctly drawn, and now
well known and generally conformed to in the profession. And, as less circuity
is made by the action in court than would be by a receiver on supplementary
proceedings, who would have to bring an independent action and then report back
to the clerk in the cause for final orders, we are inclined to stand by the decision in
McKeithan v. Walker in the limited application it has to equitable interests in
land." [Emphasis added.]Hinsdale v. Sinclair, 83 N. C. 339 (1880).
14 These changes were added by the code commissioners in their revision, by
virtue of the authority in N. C. SEss. LAWS 1881, c. 145 and 315 and N. C. SEss.
LAws 1883, c. 191. The pertinent changes were in § 488 par. 2 and § 493.
(Vol. 35
NOTES AND COMMENTS
this discussion these changes in the Code now appear in N. C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 1-353 and 1-362. Future references will be to these sections.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-353 deals with the order of examination of
the judgment debtor and/or others who might be indebted to him. The
change was an addition which reads: ". .. And the judgment creditor is
entitled to the order of examination under this and the preceding section,
although the judgment debtor has an equitable estate in land subject to
the lien of the judgment .... ." This addition clearly dispensed with a
requirement of the affidavit held necessary in Hinsdale v. Sinclair,'5 and
it has been so held.' 6
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-362 concerns the Court's authority to order the
application of property of the judgment debtor to his debt. It reads in
part: "The Court or judge may order any property, whether subject or
not to be sold under execution... to be applied towards the satisfaction
of the judgment. . . ." The clause "whether subject or not to be sold
under execution" was the addition to this section. Although no authori-
ty has been found to support this position, it is the opinion of this writer
that the purpose of this addition was to nullify the holding in the
McKeithan case and subsequent cases relying on it as authority.
According to these cases, the only instance in which a creditor's bill
was proper was where a judgment operated as a lien on equitable estates
in land which could not be sold on execution. It is submitted that the
clause "whether subject or not to be sold under execution" was intended
to include such property interests, thus eliminating the one instance in
which a creditor's bill was necessary and making supplemental proceed-
ings the remedy in all cases. As pointed out above, the change that ap-
pears in N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-353 was held to dispense with the necessity
of showing in the affidavit for the order of examination the non-existence
of any equitable estates in land subject to the lien of the judgment. The
reasons for this requirement in the affidavit were stated in Hinsdale v.
Sinclair to be ". . . to indicate the necessity of the remedy in point of
justice to the creditor, as an assurance to the court against the invoca-
tion of its aid to an idle end, and as a protection to the debtor against the
discovery of his private affairs from the curiosity or other unworthy
motive of the creditor."'17 Why eliminate this requirement if the creditor
still has to resort to a creditor's bill to reach such interest? The require-
ment was eliminated even though the purported reasons for it still existed.
1583 N. C. 339 (1880).10The First Citizens National Bank of Elizabeth City v. Hinton, 213 N. C.
162, 195 S. E. 359 (1938); Boseman v. McGill, 184 N. C. 215, 114 S. E. 10 (1922) ;
The Farmers and Mechanics National Bank of Westminister v. Bums, 109 N. C.
105, 135 S. E. 871 (1891) ; Hackney Bros. v. Arrington, 99 N. C. 110, 5 S. E. 747
(1888). But see Magruder v. Shelton, 98 N. C. 545, 4 S. E. 141 (1887), where
the court followed Hinsdale v. Sinclair on this point. Apparently the change in
the Code was not brought to its attention.
""83 N. C. 339 at 343 (1880).
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The creditor could invoke supplemental proceedings even where such
property interest existed by presenting affidavit proof of its insufficiency
to satisfy the judgment.' 8 Factors worthy of note are that the changes
in the two sections were made at the same time and the general purpose
of the Code to give more complete relief in one action.
The circuity of action objection raised in McCaskill v. Lancashire
might be answered by observing that the court could order the sale of
such property and allow other interested persons to interplead in the
supplemental proceedings.' 9
Whatever might have been, the courts have not held that supplemental
proceedings was the exclusive remedy for a judgment creditor whose
judgment could not be satisfied at law. An examination of some of the
cases decided since 1883 will reveal that the courts have neither made
supplemental proceedings the exclusive remedy nor strictly followed the
distinction indicated above as to when the use of each remedy is proper.
In Trimble v. Hunter,20 the Court said that the plaintiff had to
proceed by creditor's bill to enforce the lien on a resulting trust in
defendant's favor.21 The Court held in Everett v. Raby22 that the right
in equity of defendant to call for a conveyance of land for which he paid
the purchase money was not subject to sale under execution and said
that the remedy of the creditors was an action in the nature of a bill in
equity to subject the land to the payment of their debts. In Cooper v.
The Adel Security Co.,23 the judgment creditor brought an action in the
nature of a creditor's bill to have an account stated of the assets and
liabilities of a corporation. The only assets were unpaid stock subscrip-
tions which the Court said were a trust fund for the benefit of creditors.
The lower court dismissed the action as to defendant stockholders be-
cause there had been no personal service on defendant Security Co. The
Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the action was error and there-
by said in effect that the creditor's bill was the proper remedy. If the
law was as stated in McCaskill v. Lancashire supplemental proceedings
would have been mandatory under these facts. There are, of course,
cases in which supplemental proceedings were used to reach a property
interest of the judgment debtor that was not subject to sale under
execution.2 4
18McKeithan v. Walker, 66 N. C. 95 (1872).
"
9 Wilson v. Chichester, 107 N. C. 386, 12 S. E. 139 (1890) ; Munds v. Cassidy,
98 N. C. 558, 4 S. E. 353 (1887).20104 N. C. 129, 10 S. E. 291 (1889).
21 See also Mayo v. Staton, 137 N. C. 670 at 686, 50 S. E. 331 at 337 (1905)
where the Court in referring to the lien on a resulting trust in land, created by the
docketing of the judgment, said: "The lien can be enforced only by judgment
rendered in a civil action." The holding of the case was that this interest was not
subject to sale under execution.22104 N. C. 479, 10 S. E. 526 (1889).
23122 N. C. 463, 30 S. E. 348 (1898).
Boseman v. McGill, 184 N. C. 215, 114 S. E. 10 (1922) (cash and securities
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In Monroe Bros. & Co. v. Lewald,25 the Court held it error to
dismiss supplemental proceedings when there was a creditor's bill (which
the court assumed to be a judgment creditor's bill instead of a general
creditor's bill) pending by another person and intimated that both credi-
tor's bills and supplemental proceedings would be proper to reach some
types of property interests, by saying that the two proceedings should be
consolidated when they conflict, as where the same property is sought to
be subjected. In McIntosh Grocery Co. v. Newman,2 6 the Court said
that both remedies were still open to claimants in proper instances.
In the recent case of Cornelius v. Albertson,27 the plaintiff, a judgment
creditor of defendant, had an execution issued against the trustee of a
trust of which the defendant was the beneficiary. The res of the trust was
personal property. The trustee was not a party to the suit. The Court
said: "The plaintiff cannot reach by the execution she had issued the
property held in trust for defendant .... but must endeavor to reach it,
if she can, by a supplemental proceeding .... ,28  [Emphasis added.]
It is apparent from the foregoing cases that the Court has not always
required strict compliance with the clear cut rule stated in McCaskill v.
Lancashire. No case has been found, however, in which it was held
error to allow the remedy required by that rule.
WILLIAm G. RANSDELL, JR.
Judgments-Collateral Attack on Judgment Regular on Its Face
In Carpenter v. Carpenter,1 a husband sought to have his marriage
annulled on the ground that a decree of divorce obtained by his spouse
from her former husband was a nullity. The allegations were that the
wife, having falsely sworn that she had lived separate and apart from
her former husband for two years, failed to meet the statutory require-
ments2 which thereby invalidated her divorce and rendered her marriage
to the plaintiff without legal efficacy. The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's denial of the wife's motion to strike the
allegations. In refusing to permit the plaintiff to attack collaterally the
prior decree, the Court said:
held by another person) ; Johnson Cotton Co., Inc. v. Reaves, 225 N. C. 436, 35
S. E. 2d 408 (1945) (an interest in a judgment recovered against another).
'"107 N. C. 655, 12 S. E. 287 (1890).
26184 N. C. 370, 114 S. E. 535 (1922).
2T244 N. C. 265, 93 S. E. 2d 147 (1956).
28 Id. at 268, 93 S. E. 2d at 150. At the same page the Court, when referring to
the Supplemental Proceedings statute (N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-352 et seq.), said, "...
the provisions of this article are intended to supply the place of a proceeding in
equity, where relief was given after a creditor has determined his debt by a judg-
ment at law and was unable to obtain satisfaction by process of law."
1244 N. C. 286, 93 S. E. 2d 617 (1956). See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-4 and
§ 51-3 as to annulment.2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).
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"As against challenge on the ground of false swearing, by way
of pleading and of evidence, relating to the cause or ground for
divorce, a divorce decree, in all respects regular on the face of the
judgment roll, is at most voidable, not void."'
The Carpenter case involves a consideration of the following: (1)
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional factors; (2) direct and collateral
attacks; and (3) void and voidable judgments.
Jurisdictional factors go to the very heart of the matter 4-they in-
volve the question of whether or not the court had the power to hear
and determine the issue. A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is a
nullity. Non-jurisdictional factors, on the other hand, involve the ir-
regular or erroneous use of its judicial power by a court which ostensibly
had jurisdictional power. A judgment rendered under such circum-
stances is not a nullity. It is a valid judgment until reversedY
A direct attack upon a judgment is an attack made in the very pro-
ceeding in which the judgment was rendered, or on an appeal therefrom,
or by some separate proceeding provided by law for that sole purpose.0
If, on the other hand, the action or proceeding has an independent
purpose and contemplates some other relief or result, although the over-
turning of the judgment may be important or even necessary to its
success, then the attack on the judgment is said to be a collateral attack.7
It is the element of jurisdiction that differentiates a void from a
voidable judgment." When a jurisdictional element is missing, the court
has no authority to render any judgment at all. Therefore, any judg-
ment rendered by such court is void-a nullity which may be attacked
whenever it is offered in any proceeding. A voidable judgment, how-
ever, takes effect as intended, and continues to be effectual for all intents
and purposes until it is set aside or nullified by judicial decree.9 A
judgment that is irregular or voidable cannot be attacked collaterally.
The remedy is by direct attack through motion in the cause.10
It is held that the recitation in a judgment of jurisdictional facts, if
not contradicted by the record, will be presumed to be true, and cannot
be denied or questioned in any collateral proceeding. 1 Under this rule
-244 N. C. 286, 295, 93 S. E. 2d 617, 625 (1956).
'Woodside-Florence Irr. Dist., 121 Mont. 346, 194 P. 2d 241 (1948), Chase v.
Christianson, 41 Cal. 253, 106 P. 2d 239 (1871).
'Lawson v. Moorman, 85 Va. 880, 9 S. E. 150 (1889).
'State ex rel and to Use of Coran v. Duncan, 333 Mo. 673, 63 S. W. 2d 135(1933).
'Inter-River Drainage District of Missouri v. Henson, 99 S. W. 2d 865 (Mo.
1936). See also, 1 FREMAN, JUDGMENTs, § 321 (5th ed. 1925).
'Johnson v. Carroll, 190 Ky. 689, 228 S. W. 412 (1921).
'Voorhees v. Jackson ex dem The Bank of the United States, 35 U. S. 449
(1836) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, § 4 (1942).
10 Clark v. Homes, 189 N. C. 703, 128 S. E. 20 (1925).
'x Stocks v. Stocks, 179 N. C. 285, 120 S. E. 306 (1920) ; Rackley v. Roberts,
147 N. C. 201, 60 S. E. 975 (1908) ; Rutherford v. Ray, 147 N. C. 253, 61 S. E. 57(1908) ; Dunn v. Taylor, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 241, 94 S. W. 347 (1906).
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any judgment which is valid on the face of the record should never be
termed void. If it is necessary in attacking the judgment to present
evidence aliunde, the judgment is deemed voidable.12
In the Carpenter case the ground for divorce in the wife's action was
two years separation. This is a statutory ground for absolute divorce in
this state.' 3 Under this statute there are two requirements which the
husband and wife must meet in order to obtain the absolute divorce.
They are that the husband and wife shall have (1) lived separate and
apart for two years; and (2) the plaintiff, husband or wife, shall have
resided in this state for a period of six months. The North Carolina
Supreme Court has declared these requirements to be jurisdictional. 14
If either of these elements did not exist, the court would not have
jurisdiction to try the action and to grant a divorce.15 If the court had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the judgment in the
action is void.'0
The plaintiff in the Carpenter case alleged that his wife in her divorce
action had only been living separate and apart from her husband for a
few months. The defendant's motion to strike this allegation was denied
by the trial court, but granted by the North Carolina Supreme Court. If
this allegation be true, then the previously stated North Carolina holdings
indicate that the element of jurisdiction was missing and that the judg-
ment rendered by the court was void. The court in the Carpenter case
said that since the judgment roll was regular on its face, the judgment
was at most voidable, not void.
A case on all fours occurred in Mississippi.' There the record of the
divorce proceeding was regular on its face and both parties to the action
were in court. A divorce was granted and the husband remarried. The
husband predeceased both his first and his second wife. Under the law
of that state the surviving widow is granted certain property rights. The
first wife asked the court to declare that she was the owner of all the
property of which the deceased died seised on the the ground that she
"Pinnell v. Burroughs, 168 N. C. 315, 84 S. E. 364 (1915) ; Albertson v.
Williams, 97 N. C. 264, 1 S. E. 841 (1887); Bushee v. Surles, 77 N. C. 62 (1877).1N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).
1Young v. Young, 225 N. C 340, 34 S. E. 2d 154 (1945) ; Oliver v. Oliver,
219 N. C. 299, 13 S. E. 2d 549 (1941) ; see Sears v. Sears, 92 F. 2d 530 (D. C. Cir.19372.
S2Henderson v. Henderson, 232 N. C. 1, 59 S. E. 2d 227 (1950) ; Monroe v.
Niven, 221 N. C. 362, 20 S. E. 2d 311 (1942) ; Harrell v. Welstead, 206 N. C. 817,
175 S. E. 283 (1934).
"
0Hopkins v. Hopkins, 132 N. C. 22, 43 S. E. 508 (1903) ; Martin v. Martin,
130 N. C. 27, 40 S. E. 822 (1902) ; Nichols v. Nichols, 128 N. C. 108, 38 S. E. 296
(1901) ; Holloman v. Holloman, 127 N. C. 15, 37 S. E. 68 (1900).
17 Hester v. Hester, 103 Miss. 13, 60 So. 6 (1912). In Ex parte Edwards, 183
Ala. 659, 62 So. 775 (1913), the court refused to allow a husband to attack his
former wife's divorce decrees (the attack was, of necessity, a collateral attack)
when he alleged that the former divorce had been obtained collusively. The court
said that "for aught appearing, the ground of the divorce there set-up existed and
was proved by trustworthy testimony."
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was his lawful widow. Collaterally she made the attack on the decree
claiming that it was illegally obtained. The court, in rejecting this
collateral attack upon a judgment roll regular on its face, stated:
"Whether the court had the proper evidence before it on which to
base a decision cannot be inquired into collaterally .... The rule
is absolutely essential, in order that faith and credit may be ac-
corded by the community to the decrees and judgments of courts
of record; and that parties acting in obedience to them, or
acquiring rights under them, may have the confidence and
repose flowing from a conviction that the solemn judgments
and decisions of the higher courts, so long as they remain un-
reversed, will not be disregarded."' 8
In the Carpenter case the court was faced with the difficult problem
of having to balance the apparent injustice to the plaintiff and the public
policy involved as pointed out in the Mississippi case. To permit the
case to be relitigated would be to cast a shadow upon all cases regular
on the record. Conversely, the fraud could not be approved. This
dilemma was resolved by an extremely restricted split decision. It is
submitted that the majority and dissent do not disagree upon the same
issue, but rather that they are taking the case from different phases.
The majority are not allowing this plaintiff to bring this attack under
these circumstances, whereas it is the dissent's view that the attack is
proper because it raises jurisdictional questions. It is not doubted that
the majority would agree with the dissent as to the jurisdictional ques-
tions if the majority allowed the case to get to that point. Apparently,
therefore, the opinion says only that in this case and under this set of
facts and circumstances, the jurisdictional questions may not be raised.
If this is the view of the majority, there is no inconsistency with the
former opinions of this Court.' 9
A consideration of divorce and jurisdiction immediately brings to
mind the famous Williams cases.20 Although the Williams cases con-
cerned the jurisdictional question of domicile and the party attacking the
jurisdiction was the State of North Carolina, the two cases do have
points in common. First, the jurisdictional aspect of the divorce was
attacked by one not a party to the suit; second, in each case it is con-
tended that to recognize the divorce would result in damage to an in-
nocent party. There is, however, one major distinguishing point in the
two cases. In the Williams case the State of North Carolina, the party
attacking collaterally, had a present interest in the litigation at the time
's 103 Miss. 13, 28, 60 So. 6, 21 (1912).
'p244 N. C. 304, 93 S. E. 2d 633 (1956).
20Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
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of the divorce.21 It was upon this theory that the State could prosecute
the parties for adultery upon their second marriage which followed a
fraudulent divorce from the first marriage. Conversely, in the Carpenter
case the party attempting to collaterally attack had no interest in the prior
divorce of his spouse at the time of the divorce. Only upon his marriage,
which followed the divorce by some time, could he be called an interested
party. It seems to be only in this latter type of case that the Court will
allow the judgment record valid on its face to stand against a collateral
attack.
Applying this same theory which seems to be borne out in the recent
case of Harmon v. Harmon,22 it would seem that the party obtaining the
fraudulent divorce in the Carpenter case could be subject to prosecution
for adultery by the State.23
If the allegations made by the plaintiff in the Carpenter case are true,
it would appear that the wife in the divorce action was a party to a fraud
upon a Superior Court of North Carolina. Through this fraud, she was
able to obtain a decree of absolute divorce. With this decree she was
legally married to the plaintiff. Now she and her second husband (the
plaintiff) are living separate and apart. As she is the wife of her second
husband in the eyes of the law, she stands in a potential position of being
able to obtain suport and maintenance from him. This she may do by
virtue of the fraud she perpetrated upon the Superior Court. The hus-
band, on the other hand, is not able to attack the decree and to protect
himself by any legal means. In the Carpenter case he was denied the
right to make a collateral attack. In the cases of Shaver v. Shaver2 4
he was denied the right to make a direct attack by a motion in the cause
because he had not been a party thereto. The court itself has the power
ex mero motu to reopen the original divorce case by reason of the fraud,
but this must be done upon the motion of the court and is solely in the
court's discretion.2 5  Perhaps by appearing as a friend of the court in
" In the second Williams case Justice Frankfurter in the majority opinion
said: "But those not parties to a litigation ought not to be foreclosed by the
interested actions of others; especially not a state which is concerned with the
vindication of its own social policy and has no means, certainly no effective means,
to protect that interest against the selfish action of those outside its borders....
As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domicil, a State not a party to
the exertion of such judicial authority in another State but seriously affected by it
has a right when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to ascertain the truth or
existence of that crucial fact." 325 U. S. 226, 230 (1945).Harmon v. Harmon, 245 N. C. 83, 95 S. E. 2d 355 (1956).
.3 In the Harmon case the court says, "Since an absolute divorce dissolves the
marriage tie, ...subsequent intercourse between a former spouse and a thirdperson does not constitute adultery, provided a final decree has been rendered, and
no fraud was practiced to obtain it." It follows that cohabitation pursuant to second
marriage would constitute adultery if parties to second marriage obtained divorce
decree through collusion and in bad faith or by fraud.
244 N. C. 309, 93 S. E. 2d 614 (1956) ; 244 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 2d 615 (1956).
State v. Davis, 203 N. C. 35, 164 S. E. 737 (1932) ; Mann v. Mann, 176 N. C.353, 97 S. E. 175 (1918) ; Durham v. Cotton Mills, 144 N. C. 705, 57 S. E. 465(1907) ; Summerlin v. Cowles, 107 N. C. 459, 12 S. E. 234 (1890).
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the original divorce proceeding, the husband might induce the court to
exercise its discretion, to reinvestigate the facts ex inero inot, and to
declare the original divorce void by reason of the fraud. Clearly the
plaintiff is in need of judicial aid and his "hands are tied."'20
HENRY M. WHITESIDES
Search Warrants-Requisites for a Valid Warrant to Search for
Unlawfully Possessed Liquor
In a recent decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court, State v.
White,1 it was held that a search warrant, obtained from a justice of the
peace by a constable upon the latter's oral testimony under oath that he
had reason to believe that defendant had intoxicating liquor in her
home, and giving a description thereof, was invalid and the evidence
obtained under the warrant incompetent because the requisite provisions
of G. S. § 15-272 had not been complied with. Specifically the court
found the warrant defective because the issuing officer had not required
the constable to sign an affidavit under oath to support the issuance of
the warrant as required by G. S. § 15-27,3 which provides as follows:
Warrant issued without affidavit and examination of com-
plainant or other person; evidence discovered thereunder in-
competent.-Any officer who shall sign and issue or cause to be
signed and issued a search warrant without first requiring the
complainant or other person to sign an affidavit under oath and
examining said person or complainant in regard thereto shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor; and no facts discovered by reason of
the issuance of such illegal search warrant shall be competent as
evidence in the trial of any action: Provided, no facts discovered
or any evidence obtained without a legal search warrant in the
course of any search, made under conditions requiring the issuance
of a search warrant, shall be competent as evidence in the trial of
any action.
The application of this statute to determine the validity of a warrant
authorizing a search for unlawfully possessed liquor conflicts with several
earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. In State v. McLamb,4 in dis-
missing defendant's contention that the trial court erred in admitting
"In Patrick v. Patrick, 245 N. C. 195, 95 S. E. 2d 585 (1956), which was
decided after this case, the court allowed a party not served but who was interested
at the time of the divorce to attack the prior divorce. It was clear that the party
making the attack was an interested party at the time of the divorce and that the
point upon which he based his attack had not been part of the controversy and
adjudicated at the previous trial.
1244 N. C. 73 (1956). N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953).
Ibid.
'235 N. C. 251, 69 S. E. 2d 537 (1952).
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evidence showing him to have been in unlawful possession of liquor and
obtained under a search warrant, objected to as invalid under G. S. §
15-27' the court said ". . . the provisions of G. S. § 18-13 are applicable
rather than G. S. § 15-27. "'6 In State v. Brady,7 which involved the
validity of a search warrant issued for the same purpose, the McLamb
case was cited as authority for holding that G. S. § 18-138 rather than
G. S. § 15-279 governs the issuance of search warrants for intoxicating
liquors.
The provisions of G. S. § 18-1310 pertinent here are as follows:
Search warrants; disposal of liquor seized.-Upon the filing
of a complaint under oath by a reputable citizen or information
furnished under oath by an officer charged with the execution of
the law, before a justice of the peace, recorder, mayor, or other
officer authorized by the law to issue warrants, that he has reason
to believe that any person has in his possession, at a place or places
specified, liquor for the purpose of sale, a warrant shall be issued
commanding the officer to whom it is directed to search the place
or places described in such complaint or information; . ..
This note is an attempt to analyze the conflict between the White
case and the McLamb and Brady cases and to consider what result
might have been reached in the White case had the court considered its
prior rulings that G. S. § 18-1311 controls the legal requisites for the
valid issuance of a warrant for the search for unlawful liquor.
Other North Carolina decisions indicate that both statutes apply
with equal force to the issuance of such warrants. In State v. Rhodes,
12
the court gave no indication that one statute prevails over the other in
holding that the presumption of proper issuance of a search warrant.
arose when the warrant and accompanying affidavit appeared on their
faces to comply with the requirements of both statutes. In State v.
Harrison,'5 and State v. McMilliam,1 4 the latter being cited by the
court in support of its holding in the White case, and both involving the
legal requirements for valid issuance of warrants for the search for unlaw-
5 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953).
'State v. McLamb, 235 N. C. 251, 255, 69 S. E. 2d 537, 540 (1952).
?238 N. C. 404, 78 S. E. 2d 126 (1953). See also State v. Brady, 238 N. C. 407,
78 S. E. 2d 129 (1953) which reiterates the rule that the subject of the requirements
of the law in the issuance of search warrants for intoxicating liquors is controlled
by N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-13 (1953) rather than by N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27(1953).8 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-13 (1953).9 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-13 (1953).
"Ibid.
12233 N. C. 453, 64 S. E. 2d 287 (1951).
12239 N. C. 659, 80 S. E. 2d 481 (1954).
14243 N. C. 771, 92 S. E. 2d 202 (1956).
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ful liquor, G. S. § 15-271i is cited as to the incompetency of evidence
obtained under an illegal warrant; yet G. S. § 18-1316 is given equal
emphasis in each case. State v. Rainey'7 is of the same effect holding
that a search warrant was valid as the issuance fulfilled "the require-
ments of the controlling statutes. G. S. § 18-13 and G. S. § 15-27 as
amended."1 8
It has been observed that G. S. § 15-2719 is a restrictive statute, gen-
eral in nature and applying generally to the issuance of search warrants.
On the other hand G. S. § 18-132o is a special enabling statute applying
only to those warrants authorizing searches for unlawful liquor. It is
a general rule of statutory construction that statutes should be read
together and harmonized where possible; however if there is any neces-
sary repugnancy between them, the special statute will ordinarily prevail
over the general statute, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent.
2
'
The question then arises: Is there a necessary repugnancy between the
two statutes ?
The proviso to G. S. § 15-27,22 which was added to the statute in
1951, brought the evidentiary rule of exclusion into the law of North
Carolina. Although G. S. § 18-1323 contains no such provision and al-
though the exclusion rule is not required by due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States24 or by
the North Carolina Constitution, 25 the court has uniformly applied that
rule in cases involving searches for unlawful liquor.2 6 Thus, the court
has apparently harmonized the two statutes at least to this extent, not-
withstanding the Brady and McLamb decisions, in neither of which was
the applicability of the exclusion rule to liquor warrant cases questioned.
The sole possibility of the existence of a repugnancy between the
two statutes lies in the fact that while G. S. § 15-2727 expressly requires
". .. the complainant or other person to sign an affidavit under
oath ... .,,28 G. S. § 18-1329 is susceptible to an interpretation that a law
officer is not so required, due to the uncertain use of the correlative or in
the opening phrase of its first sentence. If the words filing of are not
carried over by the correlative to information furnished under oath by an
10N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953). 'e N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-13 (1953).
1,236 N. C. 738, 74 S. E. 2d 39 (1953).
21 d. at 740, 74 S. E. 2d 39, 40 (1953).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-13 (1953). "82 C. J. S., Statutes § 369 (1953).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953). 'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-13 (1953).
" Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
"N. C. CoNs". art I, § 15.
26 State v. Rhodes, 233 N. C. 453, 64 S. E. 2d 287 (1951), State v. Harrison,
239 N. C. 659, 80 S. E. 2d 481 (1954), State v. McMilliam, 243 N. C. 771, 92 S. E.
2d 202 (1956).
27 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953).
"Ibid.
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-13 (1953).
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officer charged with execution of the law, then G. S. § 18-1330 would
logically be construed as requiring only oral information of the procuring
officer for a valid issuance of a liquor warrant. If this be a proper
interpretation of G. S. § 18-133' and if that statute be the controlling
statute, then the decision in the White case would obviously be incorrect;
for "(I)n the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision re-
quiring the showing of probable cause to be by affidavit, its existence
may be shown either by affidavit or by sworn testimony.
'8 2
However, the writer has found no case in which it was urged that
G. S. § 18-13 3 does not require an affidavit under oath from the pro-
curing officer. Indeed in the state's appellate brief in the McLamb case,
the Attorney-General construed that statute as reading in effect: "Upon
the filing of a complaint under oath by... an officer charged with execu-
tion of the law .... -a4 Further the court, in the McLamb case, tested
the validity of the affidavit in question, signed under oath by a law
officer, by the provisions of G. S. § 18-13,35 and held that the affidavit
met the requirements of that statute.
The general proposition of the McLamb and Brady cases that G. S.
§ 18-1336 only controls the legal requisites for valid issuance of liquor
search warrants must be viewed with suspicion. Due to the brevity and
generality of the discussion in each case on this question, it is difficult to
determine the true bases of those decisions for the purpose of ascertain-
ing their precedent value.
If, as is indicated by North Carolina case law, the 1951 proviso to
G. S. § 15-2737 applies to searches for unlawful liquor, then it is quite
probable that the affidavit requirement of that statute would be carried
over also into the area of searches for unlawful liquor even if G. S. §
18-1338 does not of itself require such affidavit. This conclusion would
seem to find support in the fact that the Harrison, McMilliam and White
cases were all decided subsequent to the McLamb and Brady decisions.
Notwithstanding that the White case is probably in accord with the
better reasoning, it is unfortunate that the court in that case failed to
comment upon the McLamb and Brady cases and to explain the rela-
tionship between the two statutes compared here.
ROBERT B. MIDGETTE
30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.
" 79 C. J. S., Searches and Sei ures § 74 (1952). Where the statute provides
that issuance can be supported by probable cause based on examination under oath,
sworn oral testimony is sufficient; no written affidavit is required. Bergeman v.
State, 189 Wis. 615, 208 N. W. 470 (1926), State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545, 198 N. W.
282 (1924).
N. C. GEN. STAT, § 18-13 (1953).
Compare with express wording of N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-13 (1953).
'5 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-13 (1953). a' Ibid.
*
TN. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953). 38N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-13 (1953).
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Survival of Actions-Alienation of Affections and Criminal
Conversation
In a recent North Carolina decision,' the court raised in a dictum2
the question whether or not an action for alienation of affections or for
criminal conversation would survive the death of the tort-feasor 8
It was the accepted view at common law that these actions were
personal actions and as such did not survive the death of either of the
parties thereto. 4 However, statutory modification of the common-law
rule has now been enacted in Great Britainu and in most of the states.0
It is therefore necessary to consider the survival statute of the particular
jurisdiction to determine whether or not a certain action will survive. In
North Carolina there are two statutes that must be construed to ascertain
whether actions of alienation of affections and criminal conversation
survive. The first provides:
"§ 28-172. Action survives to and against representative.-
Upon the death of any person, all demands whatsoever, and rights
to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding, existing
in favor of or against such person, except as hereinafter provided,
shall survive to and against the executor, administrator or collector
of his estate."7
This statute was adopted in 1868,8 and has not been modified from that
date. The phrase "except as hereinafter provided" refers to the exceptions
which are included in the other relevant statute, which provides:
"§ 28-175. Actions which do not survive.-The following
rights of action do not survive:
"1. Causes of action for libel and slander, except slander of
title.
"2. Causes of action for false imprisonment and assault and
battery.
"3. Causes where the relief sought could not be enjoyed, or
granting it would be nugatory, after death."
'Hardison v. Gregory, 242 N. C. 324, 88 S. E. 2d 96 (1955), 34 N. C. L. Ray.
362 (1956), affirming award to the plaintiff in action for alienation of affections
and criminal conversation. Appeal based on application of "dead man's statute":
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51 (1953).
'Hardison v. Gregory, supra note 1, at 331, 88 S. E. 2d at 101.
'The answer to the question of the court would also be determinative of the
abatement of these actions in North Carolina. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-74 (1953).
' Suskins v. Maryland Trust Co., 214 N. C. 347, 350, 199 S. E. 276, 278 (1938)(dictum) ; Mast v. Sapp, 140 N. C. 533, 53 S. E. 350 (1906) (dictum) ; PROSSER,
TORTs 706 (2d ed. 1955).
'PROSSER, Toas 707 (2d ed. 1955).
'Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Clains For
and Against Executors and Administrators, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 969 (1931).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-172 (1950). 'N. C. Public Laws 1868-9, c. 113, § 98.
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-175 (1950).
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This statute was also enacted in 1868 ;1o but, unlike G. S. § 28-172, there
has been a significant modification of this statute. In 1915 this statute
was amended to delete an additional provision to the effect that "other
injuries to the person, where such injury does not cause death of the
injured party,"'1 . shall not survive.
In its more recent cases the court has given little attention to these
statutes, assuming that nearly all actions survive unless they fall into the
specifically named categories of subsections one and two of G. S. § 28-
175. The writer's research has not uncovered any mention by the court
whatever of subsection three. The closest the court has come to dealing
with survival in this type of case is in Allen v. Baker,'2 which was decided
before 1915 and placed its major reliance on the phrase now deleted from
G. S. § 28-175. Because of precedent,' 3 the court felt constrained to hold
that an action for breach of promise to marry would survive the death
of the tort-feasor. However, the court indicated that as an original
construction of the statute it would have reached the opposite conclusion.
It thus is clear the actual case law of North Carolina gives no support
for answering the courts recent query as to the survival of these two
"heart balm" actions in the negative. Even the analogous dicta which can
be marshalled for the negative would appear to be based on an obsolete
statutory clause.
In raising the question the court cited various authorities which were
based on the law of other jurisdictions. 14 An analysis of these authorities
shows that the other jurisdictions are not in accord on the survival of
the actions of alienation of affections and criminal conversation. How-
ever, this divergence is due mainly to the variance in the survival statutes
themselves in the different jurisdictions. It is possible to classify the ap-
plication of the various survival statutes as to alienation of affections and
criminal conversation into three groups.
First: cases applying a statute which states affirmatively that actions
for "injuries to the person" or "damages to the person" will survive.
Construing such a phrase the courts generally hold that "personal injury"
does not include the two actions in question, and that there is no sur-
vival.15 This result is justified on two bases, both grounded on rules of
'o N. C. Public Laws 1868-9, c. 113, § 64.
"N. C. Public Laws 1915, c. 38; see Hoke v. Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332,
38 S. E. 2d 105 (1946) ; Note, Survival of Personal Injury Actions in North Caro-
lina, 25 N. C. L. REv. 84 (1946).
1286 N. C. 91 (1882).
"Shuler v. Millsaps' Executor, 71 N. C. 297 (1874).
1 C. J. S., Abatement and Revival § 147 (1936) ; 1 Am. Jum., Abatement and
Revival § 99 (1936) ; Annot., 14 A. L. R. 693 (1921), 24 A. L. R. 488 (1923), 57
A. L. R. 351 (1928) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-74 (1953) ; Suskins v. Maryland Trust
Co., 214 N. C. 347, 199 S. E. 276 (1938) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-175 (1950). The
citation order is that of the court.
"5 Howard v. Lunabury, 192 Wis. 507, 213 N. W. 301 (1927) ; But see Roberts
v. Turner, 49 Ga. App. 510, 176 S. E. 91 (1934) ; C. v. D., 10 ONT. L. R. 641 (1905).
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construction. (1) Since the provision allowing survival of personal
actions is in derogation of the common law, it is to receive a strict in-
terpretation; such an interpretation would limit the survival to those
personal injuries that may be classified as tangible or physical. 10 (2)
To allow these two intangible actions to survive would be to allow all
personal actions to survive; yet, since the legislature had not stated that
all personal actions were to survive, such a result should not be sanc-
tioned by the court.
Second: cases applying a statute which provides that all actions shall
survive except certain listed ones, which list includes the same phrase
"injuries to the person" or "damages to the person." North Carolina's
statute prior to the 1915 amendment was of this type. Paradoxically, in
these cases it is also held usually that the two causes of action do not
survive.1 Here, since the term denoting personal injuries is not used
in derogation of the common law, it is given its broad meaning and the
two actions are included.
Third: cases applying a statute which does not include the phrase
"injuries to the person" or any phrase of similar import as the criterion
for survival of the action or not. It would appear that under this type of
statute the actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation
would generally survive18 unless some other phrase excludes these actions
either expressly or by implication. 19
Thus it would appear that the authorities cited by the court turn on
the interpretation of a provision that no longer exists in the North
Carolina law. One possible basis for holding that actions for alienation
of affections and criminal conversation do survive under the present
North Carolina statute would be the invoking of the subjective third
subsection of G. S. § 28-175. Yet, the writer has been unable to dis-
cover any instance of the application of this provision by the court.
Although at the present time these two causes of action are in disfavor,20
1Tangible injuries are to be distinguished from intangible injuries, usually
classified as intangible injuries are those resulting from malicious prosecution, illegal
arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, slander, libel, alienation of affections,
seduction, criminal conversation, invasion of privacy and actions of similar character.Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Clahns For andAgainst Executors and Administrators, 29 MicH. L. Rxv. 969, 975 (1931).
" Hollett v. Wilmington Trust Co., 36 Del. (6 W. W. Harr.) 170, 172 Atl.763 (1934) ; White v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 140 Md. 593, 118 Atl. 177 (1922)(pointing out the dual construction given to the phrases "injury to the person" and
"damages to the person").
8 Powers v. Sumbler, 83 Ky. 526, 110 Pac. 97 (1910) ; Smith v. Brown, 17 Pa.
D. & C. 548 (1932).
9 Gross' Adm'r v. Lerford, 190 Ky. 526, 228 S. W. 24 (1921) (provision ex-
cepting criminal conversation from surviving extended to include action for aliena-
tion of affections) ; Justice v. Clinard, 142 Tenn. 208, 217 S. W. 663 (1919) (pro-
vision excepting "wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff" from surviving held
to include action for alienation of affectibns).2 Feinsinges, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 MIcr. L. Ray. 979(1935) ; Kingsley, The Anti-Heart Bahn Statute, 13 So. CALIF. L. REV. 37 (1939).
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it would not appear that this would cause them to become "nugatory"
under the third subsection. Therefore, it is felt that when the court
examines the law on this subject in greater detail it would hold that
actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation do survive.
HENRY W. CONNELLY
Tenancy in Common-Equitable Partition-One Cotenant's Attempt
to Devise or Convey a Specific Portion of Common Property
A point decided in the recent North Carolina case of Taylor v.
Taylor1 raised the question of the effect of one cotenant's purporting to
devise or convey an absolute interest in a specific quantity of the land
held in common. The decisions in this area are not numerous, and the
ones found seem to apply a particular rule to each differing fact situation.
Nevertheless, the cases would appear to be divisible into three logical
categories, and it is believed that certain fairly consistent principles lie
behind the results of the cases involving this question.
Purported Conveyance or Devise of the Whole of the Common Property
One of the most commonly encountered situations is that in which
one cotenant, who owns only an undivided interest in the land, attempts
to transfer by deed or will the entire interest in the whole tract held in
common. As to the effect of this, all the cases seem to be in accord.
The rule here is that the transferor conveys or devises his entire interest
in the property, which is his undivided interest in the whole tract de-
scribed.2
Purported Conveyance or Devise by Metes and Bounds of a Specific
Portion of the Common Property
Where one cotenant purports to transfer by metes and bounds a
specific portion of common property, there are two defects in the transac-
tion. First, the tenant attempts to transfer the entire fee in the land
described rather than his undivided interest in it. Second, the attempted
transfer of a specific portion of the undivided tract is in effect a unilateral
attempt to partition. Thus the courts do not ipso facto give effect to
such an attempted transfer. However, most of the states which have
passed on the question find such a transfer to be merely voidable at the
election of the grantor's cotenants; and only they can avoid it if, and to
the extent that, it prejudices them.3 This has been called the equitable
' 243 N. C. 726, 92 S. E. 2d 136 (1956).
-Devises: Spitzer v. Branning, 139 Fla. 259, 190 So. 516 (1939) ; Van Reuth v.
Mayor and City Council, 165 Md. 651, 170 At. 199 (1934) ; Lushington v. Sewell,
1 Russ. & M. 174, 39 Eng. Rep. 65 (1830). Deeds: Home Owners' Loan Corp.
v. Cilley, 125 S. W. 2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Bailey v. Howell, 209 N. C.
712, 716, 184 S. E. 476, 478 (1936) (dictum) (grantee of cotenant takes only
cotenant's share and steps into his shoes).
'Highland Park Mfg. Co. v. Steele, 235 Fed. 465 (4th Cir. 1916); Lane v.
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partition doctrine.4 If the nonconveying cotenants can get their proper
share of the common property from the portion not conveyed, their in-
terests are not prejudiced and the deed by metes and bounds is operative.5
In a suit for partition brought by a nonconveying cotenant,0 the New
Hampshire court said:
".. - Her [the grantor's] deed of the whole of a distinct
parcel of the common property is good to the extent of her
interest. Her deed is also valid against the plaintiff in partition,
unless the land conveyed or some portion of it is equitably re-
quired to give him his just share in the whole. Except in such
contingency, her deed is a partition of the premises." 7
The equitable partition rule has on occasion been stated to apply
only when the portion of the land conveyed "does not exceed either in
extent or value the aliquot share of the tenant in the whole property."
Yet in a case in which the value of the part conveyed exceeded the
grantor's share, the court did give a species of equitable partition. In
Pickens v. Glassock,0 one cotenant had conveyed by metes and bounds,
apparently without consideration, 10 one acre of a large tract of common
Malcolm, 141 Ga. 424, 81 S. E. 125 (1914); Potter v. Wallace, 185 Ky. 528, 215
S. W. 838 (1919) ; Cressey v. Cressey, 215 Mass. 65, 102 N. E. 314 (1913) ; Lasater
v. Ramirez, 212 S. W. 935 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919). See Stark v. Barrett, 15 Cal.
361 (1860) where one cotenant conveyed his interest in a specific portion of the
common property. The grantee was allowed to eject a trespasser because the
conveyance was good as against everyone but the nonconveying cotenant, and the
conveyance was said to be subject to the determination of the nonconveying co-
tenant's rights.
'Although this doctrine is widely recognized, the actual term "equitable
partition" seems mainly confined to the Texas opinions cited. However, the phrase
will be used throughout this note because it represents a convenient label for this
idea.3 Zawaba v. Allen, 228 S. W. 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ; Gosch v. Vrona, 227
S. W. 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
' California has held that the grantees would be necessary parties defendant in
any partition proceedings by virtue of the real party in interest statute. Gates v.
Salmon, 35 Cal. 576 (1868). The same result would seem to be required under
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-70 (1950), requiring that parties be joined as plaintiffs or de-
fendants who are united in interest.
It seems that the transferees would not have to wait for the cotenants to bring
an action for partition, but could sue for partition themselves. This is because
they have a right to possession of the property transferred to them. Mahoney v.
Middleton, 41 Cal. 41 (1871). Also, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1950) seems to
authorize the transferee of a specific portion of common property to bring the action,
as he is definitely one of the real parties in interest.
Warner v. Eaton, 78 N. H. 515, 516, 102 Atl. 535, 536 (1917).
'86 C. J. S., Tenancy in Common § 122 (b) at 536 (1954).
'78 S. W. 2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
"0 The opinions lay no stress on the special equities of the innocent purchaser for
value in giving the grantee the right to get on partition the specific parcel conveyed
to him when this is not prejudicial to the nonconveying cotenants. See Zinn v.
Farmer, 243 S. W. 523, 525 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (dictum) (deed "at least
susceptible of the construction that it was operative as a gift," held sufficient to
convey the specific portion described). Although no direct holdings have been
found, it is thus believed that the basic operation of the equitable partition doctrine
would apply to devises as well as to cases involving deeds. In fact, the North
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property to a church. The church leased the mineral rights to the plain-
tiff who sued in trespass to try title. The equitable partition doctrine
was held to be inapplicable to set off to the grantee church the entire
acre conveyed because oil had been found on that acre and there was no
evidence that the other cotenants could get their equal share out of the
remainder of the common property. However, the court did not declare
the deed void but said "although such deed purported to convey the whole
of the title, it in fact was effective to convey only the one-half undivided
interest of the grantor."'" The court ordered a partition to give the
grantee one half of the acre.12
Of course a conveyance or devise by only one cotenant of a specific
portion of the common property may be a valid partition where the
other cotenants acquiesce in or ratify the transaction.'8
Purported Conveyance or Devise of All the Common Property by
Transferring Separate Parcels to Two or More Different Transferees
Only a few cases have been discovered where a cotenant has purported
to devise or convey by separate parcels to different transferees all of
the common property. In such a transfer, it is obvious that each could
not take the full specific portion transferred to him because the non-
conveying cotenants would have nothing whatever from which to get
Carolina court cited a deed case in the principal case of Taylor v. Taylor. Also
in Frederick v. Frederick, 219 Ill. 568, 581, 76 N. E. 856, 861 (1906), the court was
considering a devise of a specific portion of common property by metes and bounds
by one cotenant and it said: "If one cotenant attempts to convey the whole or any
part of any specific portion of the common estate, such conveyance is void at least
in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the other cotenants. The grantee
under such a conveyance may occupy the position of the grantor, but under no cir-
cumstances can his rights be any greater." The court declared the devise void
because it would prejudice the rights of the cotenants.
The sentiment quoted above, to the effect that the grantee may never have any
greater rights than his cotenant-grantor, is often seen in the opinions. Yet it is
curious to note that the grantee may have a slight preference in that the usual
cotenant never has on partition any sort of equitable claim to a specific portion
of the common property.
"
1 Pickens v. Glassock, 78 S. W. 2d 257, 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). But see
Soutter v. Porter, 27 Me. 405 (1847) where the court refused to allow a conveyance
by metes and bounds to vest in the grantee the grantor's undivided interest, saying
that the court will not permit such a construction of a deed as would convey an
estate of a different kind or description from that intended to be conveyed. No
cases are found following this theory in other jurisdictions. FREaMAN, COTENANCY
§ 206 (1882) denounces this case, saying that if a deed may not operate in the
manner intended by the parties, the courts will endeavor to construe it in such
a way that it shall operate in some other manner.
1 This case involves unusual facts and may be distinguishable. The remedy
of partition of the one acre only is uncommon. Generally partition is a proceeding
where the rights of all of the parties in all of the land in the tract are adjusted.
Caraway v. Hebert, 182 So. 164 (1938) ; 68 C. J. S. Partition § 55 (b) (2) (1950).
Co13Joyner v. Christian, 113 S. W. 2d 1229 (Tex. Comm. App. 1938); Railroadmm'n v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 125 . W. 2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939);
Berryman v. McDonald, 107 S. W. 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908). Acquiescence or
ratification is generally found where the nonconveying cotenant either takes the
remaining part and lives on it and improves it or merely abides by the sale volun-
tarily for a period of years.
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their portions. Other than the principal case, the only such decision the
writer has found is the New Mexico case of Madrid v. Borrego.14 A
cotenant with a one-half undivided interest purported to convey half of
the tract to grantee A. Later, he purported to convey the other half of
the land to grantee B. The nonconveying cotenant's heirs brought an
ejectment action against both A and B. The'trial court refused to grant
the ejectment and the plaintiffs appealed. The supreme court reversed
and remanded in order to allow more evidence to be taken as to whether
a partition by acquiescence had taken place after the first deed had been
made. If there had been a partition by acquiescence after the delivery
of the first deed, the second deed would be void because the property
described would belong to the nonconveying cotenant.1
However, the court did discuss the legal situation which would arise
if there were not acquiescence by the plaintiff. Although dictum, it
would appear to be in the nature of instruction for the trial court if it so
found the facts. The court said 6 that each grantee would own a one-half
undivided interest in the specific portion attempted to be conveyed to
him. The nonconveying plaintiff would in this case continue to own his
undivided interest in the whole, now split up into two tracts held as
tenancies in common. The court did not speak of possible prejudice to
the plaintiff in having his former undivided interest in a large tract
divided into undivided interests in two smaller tracts. It is possible that
in the particular case all of the land was of the same value uniformly
throughout the tract, and that location of any portion on partition would
not affect the value of the land to the tenant. The solution offered by
this court seems to be an extension, a doubling of the remedy applied in
Pickens v. Glassock. Yet it is clear that a rigid split of a large tract of
common property into two smaller tracts of common property would
often be prejudicial to the rights of the nonconveying cotenant. What
the court would do in such a case does not appear.
The principal North Carolina case, Taylor v. Taylor, concerned the
construction of a will in which the testator devised half of the common
property to son A; the other half of the common property was devised to
son B. Son C was devised another tract, but this devise was void for
reasons not material here. The court held that the attempted devises
to sons A and B were void for uncertainty. 17 The court quoted as
authority a legal encyclopedia to the effect that "where there are two
"54 N. M. 276, 221 P. 2d 1058 (1950). 15 See note 13 supra.
18 Madrid v. Borrego, 54 N. M. 276, 278, 221 P. 2d 1058, 1060 (1950) (dictum).
"'The court was asked to construe the will, and counsel for both sides failed
to argue this specific question in their briefs. The lower court had held these
same devises to A and B to be invalid because the intention of the testator could
not be carried out since he thought he was the owner of all of this common property.
The North Carolina Supreme Court did not mention this and did not include it in
its reasons for declaring the devises void.
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tenants in common, each owning an undivided half of land, neither can
make a partition that will be binding on the other by assuming to convey
either half specifically."'" It seems that this rule is not clearly applicable
to the facts of this case but would apply to the previous category covered
where there was a conveyance by metes and bounds of a specific portion
less than the whole. Neither does the rule seem to consider the equitable
partition doctrine, although the legal encyclopedia quoted states in
another section that most courts do recognize it.19
The result of this case did not seem to defeat the overall intention
of the testator since it threw the testator's interest in this realty into
intestacy and resulted in an equal division of realty between sons A, B,
and C. A holding otherwise as to the attempted devise of the property
owned in common would have caused C to be left out entirely. However,
the situation can easily be imagined in which voiding such a mistaken
devise and letting the undivided interest pass either by the residuary
clause or by intestacy would wreck the entire testamentary scheme.
A perfect example would be furnished by this very case had the devise
of the individual tract to C been valid; he would then have taken the
tract devised to him plus whatever share in the common property might
come to him by the residuary clause 0 or by intestacy.
It is submitted that the holding of the North Carolina court in the
Taylor case should be restricted to its facts in subsequent cases insofar
as it may indicate that North Carolina would not follow the equitable
partition doctrine. It is doubtful whether the court even considered the
doctrine, since it did not mention it. Justice was done in this particular
case but the rule of law applied there could create a grave injustice in
subsequent cases. Certainly the equitable partition doctrine should be
invoked at least as to conveyances to purchasers for value. And, there
does not seem to be any real reason why it could not apply as well to
devises when to follow the doctrine would more nearly carry out the
intention of the testator.21
PHILLIP C. RANSDELL
1868 C. J. S., Partition § 9 (c) (1950). The only case cited to support this
statement was ]Eaton v. Talmadge, 24 Wis. 217 (1869). The proposition, unsup-
ported by citation of authority, did appear in that case, but it seems to be dictum
since the court actually upheld the partition. One cotenant had conveyed a
specific portion by metes and bounds, and the other cotenant subsequently conveyed
the remainder of the property also by metes and bounds. The court held both
conveyances to be valid since the latter conveyance was an acquiescence in the
partition effected by the original conveyance.1886 C. J. S., Tenancy in Common § 122 (b) (1954).
30 See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42.2 (Supp. 1955).
2'1 Assuming a case of a deed or devise of halves of a tract to each of two
transferees as in the Madrid and Taylor cases, it is clear that the intent of the
testator or grantor might most nearly be approximated with fairness to the non-
conveying cotenant by giving each transferee a one-fourth undivided interest in
the whole. The problem of the split of the common property discussed in con-
nection with the Madrid case would be avoided. But this solution would not be
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Trusts-Power to Execute Long Term Leases
In In re Menzel's Wilt' a trustee sought court authority to execute a
lease of trust property that would run beyond the probable duration of the
trust. The settlor, as an executor, and her co-executor had granted a
lease to certain real property located in the business district of Min-
neapolis. The lease agreement was for 99 years, from 1906 to 30 April,
2005, and it would terminate absolutely at the expiration of that term.
This lease provided for a net annual cash rental of $8,000 and there was
no provision for readjustment of this figure.
Under the testamentary trust created by the settlor, her interest in
this land and lease were to be held by the trustee for two named bene-
ficiaries for life, the trust to terminate upon the death of the survivor and
the res to be distributed to the three children of one of the beneficiaries
or to their surviving lineal descendants 'and in the absence of lineal
descendants, that share to the surviving individuals or their representa-
tives. One of the three remaindermen had been declared dead and the
other two presently have a total of ten children. The appellant had been
named guardian ad litem of these ten children and any other contingent
remaindermen who may now or in the future have an interest in the trust.
The trustee also held an interest in the land and lease as guardian for
one of the beneficiaries who is an incompetent. The other beneficiary of
the trust held the remaining undivided interest in the land and lease and
joined with the appellee, who was acting as trustee and guardian with
respect to the other two undivided interests in the land, in seeking the
Court's permission in 1956 to negotiate a new lease agreement.
The new agreement for which court approval was sought amends the
1906 lease and, in part, provided for: (1) An immediate increase in rent
from $8,000 to $16,000 per year with provisions for readjustments be-
tween $12,000 and $31,000 per year; (2) an extension of the lease from
30 April 2005 to 30 April 2055; (3) an option to buy the property in
2055 in accordance with an appraisal as of 30 April 2052; and (4) an
option to extend the lease to 30 April 2105 if the option to buy is not
exercised.
All adult persons in being having any interest gave their written
possible in most jurisdictions because it would give the transferees interests in the
whole tract when their metes and bounds descriptions only purported to give them
an interest in one half. A conveyance cannot pass the property beyond the bounds
of the area described. Potter v. Wallace, 185 Ky. 528, 215 S. W. 538 (1919) ;
Kenoye v. Brown, 82 Miss. 607, 35 So. 163 (1903) ; Brown v. Pearson, 180 S. W.
895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915). But see Young v. Edwards, 33 S. C. 404, 11 S. E.
1066 (1890) holding that if at all possible, the portion conveyed to the grantee by
metes and bounds will be set off to him upon partition, but if it cannot be done, the
warranties in the deed will give him by estoppel the part that is set off to the
grantor.
1247 Minn. 559, 77 N. W. 2d 833 (1956).
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consent to the amended lease agreement; but the guardian ad litem on
behalf of the contingent remainderment objected and pointed out that
the trust will terminate upon the death of the last surviving beneficiary,
that the beneficiaries have life expectancies of 12, 11 and 9.47 years, and
that the rule prohibiting a trustee from entering into a lease which ex-
tends beyond the known or probable termination date of the trust is
thereby violated. The Court held that the amendment was authorized
since it was reasonable under the circumstances and was in the best
interests of the trust and of the trust beneficiaries.
While resting its decision on statutory authority, the Court acknowl-
edged the broad powers conferred by the trust instrument and cited that
grant of powers in support of its holding. However, the significance
of the decision that the trustee had power to lease the trust property
for long terms extending beyond the duration of the trust is not di-
minished by the fact that the court based its decision primarily on
statutes. For the court indicated that it could have reached the same
decision without the aid of statutes and stated, with respect to the
applicable portions of these statutes, that they ". . . are declaratory of
the well recognized and inherent power of the court to authorize leas-
ing .. ."2 The statutory provisions so construed state, "The district
court may, by order, on such terms and conditions as seem just and
proper, in respect to rentals and renewals, authorized such a trustee to
lease such real property for a term exceeding five years, if it appears to
the satisfaction of the court that it is for the best interest of the trust
estate, . . ."3 Therefore, it is necessary to review the case law dealing
with this issue in order to determine the proper basis for such a holding
in the absence of statutory authority.
By express provision in the trust instrument, a settlor may give the
trustee power to execute leases which will run beyond the duration of
the trust and leases made in compliance with that provision will be
binding upon the remainderman. The power being exercised, it in effect
2 Id. at 567, 77 N. W. 2d at 838.
M. S. A. § 501.22 Subd. 4 (1945); M. S. A. § 501.24 (1945) contains sub-
stantially the same provisions. The statutes referred to here are the counterpart
of a New York statute and apparently they were adopted from it. See 4 BoGoRT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 791 (1948) and Note, 14 MINN. L. Rav. 274 at 281
(1930). In addition, these statutes provide that where a trustee is to hold real
property during the life of a beneficiary and pay the income received from it to
the use of the beneficiary, the trustee may lease the property for a term not
exceeding five years without application to the court. M. S. A. § 501.22 Subd. 3
(1945) ; M. S. A. § 501.24 (1945). It is this section of the statute that changed the
state of the law and this provision has been held to be an extension of the power
of the trustee rather than a restriction. And, where prior to the statute such a
lease was valid only until the termination of the trust, it was now valid for any
term up to five years regardless of the duration of the trust itself. This is pointed
out in Weir v. Barker, 104 App. Div. 1112, 93 N. Y. Supp. 732 (1905) ; 54 Am. JUR.,
Trusts § 474 (1945) ; Annot., 61 A. L. R. 1368 (1928).
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limits the estate of those entitled at the termination of the trust.4 This
express power to lease is of two types. First, the settlor may have
auhorized a lease for a definite term; or, second, the settlor may have
given the trustee unlimited power to lease. In the latter case, the trustee
is subject only to the conditions that the terms of the lease be reasonable,
that he acted in good faith, and in the best interests of the trust.
Although the power to lease is not expressly given, it may be impliedly
given where it is necessary to the performance of other duties expressly
conferred upon the trustee and where it will enable him to carry out the
purposes and intents of the settlor.6 The trust instrument, and all the
surrounding circumstances determine whether or not his implied power
exists and if so its scope. Such power has been raised by implication
where the trustee was directed to receive and dispose of rents, profits,
and income to certain beneficiaries and purposes ;7 and where the trustee
was given the "entire control, management, and charge of the estate."
In the principal case, the settlor provided that the trustees "shall have
and as freely exercise all rights and powers of dominion and ownership
over and with respect to . .,. the trust estate as I could or might exercise
if living.... The trustees ... are ... to collect the principal, income,
rents, issues, profits, and accruals thereof, and ... to pay, .. . and dis-
tribute the same ... for the use and benefit of the beneficiaries. . .."
In light of the above decisions and the nature of the trust property, this
language is clearly sufficient to raise an implication of a power in the
trustee to lease.
Where the trustee exercises an implied power to lease without first
making application to the courts, two questions are raised as to the
validity of that lease. First, is the term of the lease reasonable ?1o Factors
determinative of the reasonableness of such leases are the nature and
location of the property, the ordinary and customary periods of leases
of that type of property in that locality, the rights of the beneficiaries and
remaindermen, the purposes of the trust, and the uses for which the trust
property can reasonably be devoted. 1 Second, can a lease reasonably be
executed by a trustee which will extend beyond the duration of the trust?
It is generally held that in the absence of express or statutory authority
the trustee is without power to execute leases extending beyond the
'Raynolds v. Browning, King and Co., 217 App. Div. 443, 217 N. Y. Supp. 15(1920), aff'd inem., 245 N. Y. 623, 157 N. E. 884 (1927) 2 ScoTT ON TRUSTS § 189.3
(1956).
'4 BOGERT, TRUST AND TRUSTEES §§ 782, 783 (1948).
54 Ag JIUR., Trusts § 471 (1945).7 Hutcheson v. Hodnett, 115 Ga. 990, 42 S. E. 422 (1902) ; Cox v. Kinston C. R.
and Lumber Co., 175 N. C. 299, 95 S. E. 623 (1918).8 Upham v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, 140 N. W. 5 (1913).
247 Minn. 559, 564, 77 N. W. 2d 833, 836 (1956).
"°Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 Atl. 648 (1929); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES, § 786 (1948) ; 2 ScOTr ON TRUSTS § 189.1 (1956).
1154 Am. JUR., Trusts § 472 (1945) ; 90 C. J. S., Trusts § 319 (1955).
[Vol. 35
NOTES AND COMMENTS
duration of the trust; or, where the term of the trust is uncertain, beyond
the probable duration of the trust. Such leases are not binding on the
remainderman, the excess of the lease beyond the life of the trust being
void.12  However, where the duration of the trust is uncertain, a lease
extending beyond the probable duration of the trust is valid for the actual
duration of the trust, if it is otherwise reasonable. 1 3 There is a minority
view that such leases are binding upon the remaindermen if they are
reasonable and if they give effect to the scheme and intent of the settlor.
The fact that the lease extends beyond the duration of the trust is a factor
to consider in determining the reasonableness of the term.14 Therefore,
if a trustee relying on implied authority to lease has any doubt as to
the necessity for or reasonableness of a particular lease, or his power to
execute that lease; he should, for the protection of the trust and himself,
secure court authority in advance of its execution. 15 If he acts without
such authorization, the lease may be void as to the remainderman and
he may be liable for breach of trust. He may be liable even where he
could have obtained court authority for such a lease by prior application
to the court.' 6
In proper cases, courts of equity have power to authorize a lease of
trust property for a period longer than that expressly or impliedly per-
mitted by the terms of the trust or beyond the duration or probable
duration of the trust and such a lease will be binding on the remainder-
man.17 Whether a particular case is a proper one will depend largely
upon the jurisdiction in which the case arises and the circumstances of
that case. Circumstances to be considered are: (1) changes in economic
conditions; (2) changes in the physical condition of the property; (3)
changes in the purposes for which the property may be used; and (4)
changes in the neighborhood in which the property is situated.' 8 The
court may direct or permit a departure from the terms of the trust where
a change of circumstances unknown and unanticipated by the settlor
would defeat or substantially impair the fulfillment of the intent and pur-
poses of the trust.19 There is a division of opinion, as evidenced by
"Re Caswell, 197 Wis. 327, 222 N. W. 235 (1928); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 787 (1948); Annot., 61 A. L. R. 1368 (1928).182 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 189.2 (1956).
1 Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 Atl. 648 (1929) ; Noted in 14 MINN. L.
R. 194, 274 (1930); 90 C. J. S., TRUSTS § 319 (1955); 4 BOGER, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 788, 789 (1948). Bogert lists Delaware, Maryland, Maine and Con-
necticut in the minority group and takes a position tending to favor the minority
rule, especially where modem business property in large cities is involved.
1" Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 At. 548 (1929).
144 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 790 (1948); 54 Am. JuR., Trusts §
474 (1945).
° 0T Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N. E. 409 (1905).
1 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 790 (1948).
2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 167 (1956); 54 Am. JuR., Trusts § 284 (1945).
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the cases, as to what circumstances constitute an exigency that warrants
the authorization of such long term leases.
A minority of courts have authorized long term leases for which
there was no express or statutory provision in cases where it found: (1)
that the execution of such lease was within the implied power of the
trustee ;20 (2) that it was necessary to permit such a deviation from the
express terms of the trust because exigencies arose after the death of
the settlor which would practically defeat the trust; and (3) that the
proposed lease was reasonably designed to meet these changes. Under
these circumstances, these courts will assume the position of the settlor
and grant such equitable relief as it in its sound discretion deems best to
accomplish the purposes of the trust.2 1 The court may exercise this
power in order to assure a proper income to the beneficiaries.22  State-
ments representative of language which the courts have found to convey
an implied power to execute such leases appear in Upham v. Plankinton28
and in In re Grays Estate.2 4 In the Upham case, the trust instrument
conferred upon the trustee the "entire control, management, and charge
of the estate" and the court stated that there was an implied power to
-execute leases for reasonable terms, that a 99 year lease was not un-
reasonable under the circumstances, and that it was in the best interest of
the estate. The testator, in In re Gray's Estate, stated that the trustees
should have the power to "manage and control ... sell and convey" any
part of the trust estate. The court held that the execution of a 99 year
-lease was not beyond the powers of trustees conferred upon them by the
testator. Even in the absence of terminology in the trust instrument
from which power to execute a long term lease could be implied and
where there was no necessity to preserve the corpus of the trust, several
cases have gone so far as to authorize the execution of 99 year leases on
the ground that without such relief the trust property would become
20 Marshall's Trustee v. Marshall, 225 Ky. 168, 7 S. W. 2d 1062 (1928) ; Upham
v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, 140 N. W. 5 (1913).
2 Packard v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 261 Ill. 450, 104 N. E. 275 (1914)
Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N. E. 409 (1905); Smith v. Widmann Hotel
Co., 74 S. D. 118, 49 N. W. 2d 301 (1951).
222 ScoTT oN TRUSTS § 189.4 (1956).
22 152 Wis. 275, 140 N. W. 5 (1910). In this case the settlor left valuable busi-
ness property in trust. The value of the land had greatly increased but the buildings
had deteriorated so that very large capital outlays would be necessary to adequately
improve the property. In order to secure lessees willing to make such improvements
on the property, the trustees wanted approval of 99 year leases which it had
negotiated. The trust would terminate upon the death of a beneficiary who had a
life expectancy of approximately 16 years.
24 196 Wis. 383, 220 N. W. 175 (1928). In this case the property in question was
a lot in a city business district renting at $1,400 per annum. The value of the
property had increased rapidly since the creation of the trust. The proposed lease
provided for the erection of a building by the lessee costing not less than $100,000
with rent increasing over a 50 year period from $3,500 to $7,500 and then for the
next 49 years at $7,500 per annum. The trust was for the life of the settlor's
daughter and until a grandson should reach 30 years of age.
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"substantially unproductive" ;25 or that it was a good business venture
and beneficial to all interested parties. 26
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the majority of the courts are more
hesitant to permit a long term lease where- exigencies have arisen if the
existence of the trust is not clearly endangered. In these jurisdictions,
it must be shown that such leases are absolutely necessary to preserve
the trust estate.27 A long term lease, even though it is an advantageous
one, will not be permitted if the trust can be preserved with leases of
shorter duration.28 The fact that a 99 year lease may be beneficial to all
parties in interest is not sufficient reason to authorize it.29 The emphasis
is on preservation and, in the absence of express power in the trustee
to execute such a lease, the court will not authorize it unless it is
essential to the preservation of the corpus of the trust.3 0 The majority
view places considerable emphasis upon the protection of the remainder-
man. The long term leases are rejected because of the feeling that they
confer benefits upon the benficiary at the expense of the remainderman 3l
in contradiction of the settlor's expressed plan for distribution of his
property.3 2 Weight is also placed upon the fact that the remainderman
is deprived of a valuable right by a long term lease in that he is ordi-
narily entitled to possession of the property, free of encumbrances and
restrictions, upon the termination of the trust.33
In the principal case, the court states that where, "because of changed
conditions caused by monetary devaluation, the beneficiaries are deprived
of substantial income which the settlor intended them to have" relief
should be granted the same as it is in cases where such relief is necessary
to preserve the corpus.3 4 Since the power to lease may be inferred from
the testatrix's will, and in view of the circumstances-the present low
rental, the term for which the present lease will run, the great increase
in benefits that will accrue to the beneficiaries and remainderman, the
provisions for adjustments in rent, the type and location of the property,
and the approval of the adult remaindermen-the holding in this case is
an equitable one even though it is not necessary to preserve the trust
estate and even though the lease probably will extend 80 years beyond
the life of the trust; and may, if the option is exercised, outlast the trust
by 130 years. Although contra to the majority view, it is submitted
that this approach is the more desirable one under the circumstances.
"' Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N. E. 306 (1900).
" Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N. E. 409 (1905).
" 4 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 790 (1948).
" Hubbell v. Hubbell, 135 Iowa 637, 113 N. W. 512 (1907).
" Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 Atl. 648 (1929).
" Re Caswell, 197 Wis. 327, 222 N. W. 235 (1928).
"Ibid.
"4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 790 (1948).
"2 Scorr oN TRUSTS § 189.2 (1956).
,247 Minn. 559, 569, 77 N. W. 2d 833, 839 (1956).
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Apparently, there are no cases in North Carolina involving leases for
a period of 99 years. But there are two cases where, without express
authority in the trust instrument, the trustee leased the property for
long terms, the longest period being for 30 years. The cases, Cox v.
Kinston C. R. and Lumber Co.35 and Waddell v. United Cigar Stores of
Anterica,3 6 may give some indication of the position our Court would take
if a case involving a 99 year lease arose. In the Cox case, the Court
found that the trust was to terminate at the death of the trustee.
The trustee, at the age of 66 and without prior court approval,
entered into a lease with the defendant. The lease was to run for five
years with options in the lessee so that it could run for twenty years if
the options were exercised. Seven years later the trustee died, the
remaindermen sought possession and the defendant contended that he
had exercised his option. The court held that the trustee had no power
to execute a lease which would extend beyond the duration of the
trust. The Court classified the cases on this subject as those where the
trustee attempted to lease without securing court authorization and
those where he asked the authorization of the court before executing the
lease. The court was of the opinion that, in cases of the first type, it was
uniformly held that a trustee has no power to execute a lease extending
beyond the duration of the trust and that, in the latter class, courts of
equity have the power to enlarge the powers of the trustee. As a general
proposition, this classification reflects the trend of authority. Undoubted-
ly, where there is no express authority, the trustee would be well advised
to seek court advice before executing a lease of this nature. But, it may
be noted that there is some authority for the view that the lease may not
be invalidated by the trustee's failure to seek court approval in advance
if the court would have approved the lease if the trustee had asked for
its approval prior to the execution of the lease and if the power to lease
can be implied and shown to have been necessarily exercised.3 7
In the Waddell case, the trust was to terminate upon the death of two
designated beneficiaries who had life expectancies of 44.9 and 45.5 years.
The trustee proposed to lease the property to the defendant for 30 years
and initiated this action for the purpose of obtaining the Court's advance
approval. The trial court found that the trustee had an implied power
to lease.38 Since the two beneficiaries had life expectancies considerably
longer than the term of the proposed lease and the trustee had implied
175 N. C. 299, 95 S. E. 623 (1918).8195 N. C. 434, 142 S. E. 585 (1928) ; See, Note, 7 N. C. L. Rav. 94 (1929).
McCrory v. Beeler, 155 Md. 456, 142 A. 587, 588 (1928) ; Grady v. Robinson,
180 Ore. 315, 175 P. 2d 463 (1946).
"' The language from which authority to lease could be implied gave the trustee
power "to handle, manage, control and improve in such way as to him may seem
desirable and to collect all income." Waddell v. United Cigar Stores of America,
195 N. C. 434, 435, 142 S. E. 585, 586 (1929).
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power to lease, the court found that the issue that trustees may not
execute leases extending beyond the duration of the trust without express
authority was not necessarily raised. In view of these two decisions,
it appears that a trustee, With only implied authority to lease, may validly
execute leases which will not extend beyond the probable duration of
the trust. But, where the lease will extend beyond the probable life of
the trust, the excess will not bind the remainderman if the trustee failed
to secure advance court approval. If the trustee makes application to
the court for its approval in advance, it appears that he may be authorized
to execute such lease as is absolutely necessary to preserve the trust.
However, if the North Carolina Court should be consulted in a case
similar on its facts to the principal case, on the basis of the two cases
considered above, it is doubtful if it would approve such a lease.
CHARLES J. NooE
Workmen's Compensation-Eye Injuries and Loss of Vision
The amount of compensation awarded for eye injuries is considerable
although such injuries account for a very small percentage of the
Workmen's Compensation cases. Earning power is often dependent
upon visual acuity and an employee deserves high compensation for the
loss or impairment of his sight. In New York it has been estimated that
eye injuries constitute approximately three per cent of all industrial
injuries but the average cost for eye injuries is about twice the average
for other injuries.' In North Carolina during the period July 1, 1954,
to June 30, 1955, there were 137 cases involving eye injuries closed by
the Industrial Commission and the amount of compensation was
$354,975.00.2
Loss of vision is compensable under all the Workmen's Compensation
statutes.- A specified sum for loss of an eye is granted and total loss of
vision is usually compensated for as loss of an eye. Under the North
Carolina statute an employee suffering an eye injury resulting in total
loss of vision is granted sixty per cent of his average weekly wages during
one hundred and twenty weeks.8
Partial loss is compensated in such proportion as the partial loss bears
to the total loss and an eighty-five per cent, or more, loss- is deemed
"industrial blindness" and compensated as total loss of vision.4
'Davidson, The State Labor Department Ophthalmologist, 8 INDUSTRIAL MEDI-
ciNE, Number 4, 153.
'Letter from Mr. R. F. Thomas, Deputy Commissioner, North Carolina Indus-
trial Commission, to Herbert L. Toms, Jr., January 22, 1957.
S N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (q).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (t) : "Total loss of use of a member or loss of vision
of an eye shall be considered as equivalent to the loss of such member or eye. The
compensation for partial loss of or for partial loss of use of a member or for partial
loss of vision of an eye or for partial loss of hearing shall be such proportion of
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Throughout the country there has been considerable conflict in court
decisions as to what method should be used in determining loss of
vision.5 Granting that a correcting lens will improve certain types of
defective vision, the question has arisen whether to use corrected visual
acuity or uncorrected visual acuity, i.e., that acuity a person has with his
naked eye unaided by a corrective lens.
The North Carolina statute is silent as to which method the Industrial
Commission is to use. However, from the beginning the Commission has
determined the extent of loss of vision on the basis of uncorrected vision,
before and after the injury, and at the same time has required the em-
ployer to furnish glasses as part of the treatment. In 1938 the North
Carolina Supreme Court approved this method of determination in
Schrun v. Catawba Upholstering Co.6 for those cases in which there
was not a complete loss of vision. However, the Court disapproved the
method where there was total loss of vision, and held that the extent of
loss should be based on corrected vision before the accident. The em-
ployee in this case had visual acuity of 20/20 (100 per cent visual
efficiency) with glasses and 20/40 (84.6 per cent visual efficiency) with-
out glasses before the accident in which he suffered a complete loss of
vision. The Court held that he was entitled to compensation for 100 per
cent loss, rather than 83.6 per cent loss. It is submitted that the decision
in this case was correct inasmuch as an employee wearing glasses and
suffering a complete loss of vision has been injured to the same extent
as an employee having 20/20 visual acuity without glasses before such
an accident.
However, conflicting opinions exist as to the method to be used when
vision is not completely destroyed but only impaired in such a manner
that a correcting lens will afford good visual acuity. A number of courts
have adopted the "corrected" rule which measures vision with glasses
both before and after the accident.7 In North Carolina under the method
approved in the Shrunm case, an employee with uncorrected vision of
20/20 before the accident and 20/230 after the accident is deemed to
have suffered a total loss of vision without regard to the fact that his
the payments above provided for total loss as such partial loss bears to total loss,
except that in cases where there is eighty-five per centum, or more, loss of vision
in an eye, this shall be deemed 'industrial blindness' and compensated as for total
loss of vision of such eye."
'Annot., 8 A. L. R. 1330 (1920); 24 A. L. R. 1469 (1923); 73 A. L. R. 716(1931); 99 A. L. R. 1507 (1935); 142 A. L. R. 822 (1943).
'214 N. C. 353, 199 S. E. 385 (1938) (dictum).
Washington Terminal Co. v. Hoage, 65 App. D. C. 33, 79 F. 2d 158 (1935);
Lambert v. Industrial Commission, 411 Ili. 593, 104 N. E. 2d 783 (1952) ; Powers
v. Motor Wheel Corp., 252 Mich. 639, 234 N. W. 122 (1930); McNamara v. Mc-
Harg-Barton Co., 200 App. Div. 188, 192 N. Y. S. 743 (1922); Roveran v. Frank-
linshire Worsted Mills, 124 Pa. Super, 119, 188 Atl. 78 (1936), Traveler's Insurance
Co. v. Richmond, 291 S. W. 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Keltz v. General and
Fruit Products, 34 Hawaii 317 (1937).
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vision might be improved with glasses, or even restored to 20/20 visual
acuity. This employee is granted the same compensation as a person
receiving an injury resulting in permanent loss of vision who cannot be
aided by glasses. Where glasses will restore visual acuity, has the
employee really suffered a total loss of vision? He is far from "in-
dustrially blind" with glasses and yet is paid for total loss of vision. This
employee may deserve some compensation for having to wear glasses, if
he did not wear glasses before the accident, but he does not deserve as
much compensation as the employee who is "industrially blind" and can-
not be aided by glasses.
The preceding example is rather extreme as such a person would
probably not achieve binocular vision with a heavy lens over one eye and
therefore could not really use his corrected vision. A more frequent
situation is where an employee with 20/20 visual acuity suffers an eye
injury not resulting in total loss of vision. The probability that his
sight can be corrected to 20/20 with glasses is not considered in our cases
and he is paid for 20 per cent loss of vision. The practical effect of
this problem is even clearer when it is considered that many people with
only a 20 per cent loss of vision do not wear glasses except for driving,
reading, or upon some job that requires a high degree of vision. It is
estimated that between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of the adult working
population have subnormal vision without the use of corrective lenses
and yet such persons are compensated upon the basis of their uncorrected
vision after the accident. It seems doubtful that an employee suffering
an impairment of vision which can be corrected with glasses deserves
the same compensation as the employee who suffers a "real" loss of
vision that cannot be corrected. One of the medical authorities in this
field has said: "It is obviously an illogical and unfair procedure to make
visual tests for compensation without the use of corrective lenses."8
Another frequent situation in eye injury cases in where the employee
has less than 100 per cent visual efficiency before an accident but by the
use of glasses has corrected vision of 20/20. For example, an employee
has 20/70 vision correctible to 20/20 prior to an eye injury and follow-
ing the injury his vision is 20/100 and cannot be aided by lenses. This
individual will be compensated for 15.1 per cent loss under the North
Carolina rule of using uncorrected vision both before and after the
accident. However, he would be compensated for a 51.1 per cent loss by
using the rule of best corrected vision both before and after the accident.
If his vision could be corrected with glasses, then he would receive no
compensation under the "corrected" rule but would be compensated for
15.1 per cent loss under the "uncorrected" rule. At least one writer9
' SNELL, MEDICOLEGAL OPHTHALMOLOGY 73 (1940).
Comment, 28 NOTRE DAME LAW. 152, 154 (1952).
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has suggested that neither rule is perfect but it is submitted that the
"corrected" rule gives better results for the employer and the employee.
As in North Carolina, many state statutes are silent on whether to
use corrected or uncorrected vision in computing loss. Seven jurisdic-
tions by court decision'0 have adopted the rule of using best corrected
vision as a basis for computation and six states" have expressly adopted
this method by statute. Two jurisdictions12 have adopted the "corrected"
rule for certain situations and rejected it for others. Ten states13 have
court decisions which approve or adopt the rule that loss of vision shall
be computed without reference to whether or not glasses will correct the
condition and Maryland 14 has adopted this rule by statute. In his
treatise on Medicolegal Ophthalmology, Dr. Snell Criticizes the Maryland
statute: "Such a provision shows a complete misunderstanding of the
physical and physiological need for and the use of corrective ophthalmic
lenses. It is incomprehensible that it could have ever been included in
any statute."'15 Some courts state that glasses perform the same function
as a brace or crutch and therefore their use should not reduce compensa-
tion for a loss. It is true that a foot brace, crutch, wig, or other artificial
aids are not considered in computing compensation but Dr. Snell points
out that there is no logical analogy between crutches and glasses. A
crutch is an artificial support made necessary by some injury or disease.
On the other hand all persons with normal eyes will require glasses for
close work sometime between the ages of 40 and 50 and no person can
escape these normal changes which ultimately necessitate the use of
corrective lenses.'
In 1940 the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association
adopted a report submitted by Drs. Snell, Cradle, and Cowan entitled
1 Cases cited note 7 supra.
"ARK. STATS. (1947, § 81-1313 (c) (18)) ; CONN. GEN. STATS. 1949, § 7430 (f);
Sec. 13 of c. 31, Rzv. STAT. MAINE, 1954; MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 152, § 36 (b)
(1949) ; GEN. LAWS R. I. 1938, c. 300, art. II § 12 (c) ; BURNS' ANN. IND. STATS.,
1952, § 40: 1303 (3), but see Shaw v. Rosenthal, 112 In. A. 468, 42 N. E. 2d 383
(1942) in which the court decided that there were two classes of impairment and
vision with glasses would only be used in one class.
12 Kelley v. Prouty, 54 Idaho 225, 30 P. 2d 769 (1934) ; Foster v. Schmahl, 197
Minn. 602, 268 N. W. 631 (1936).
1 Globe Cotton Oil Mills v. Industrial Accident Commission, 64 Calif. App.
307, 221 Pac. 658 (1923) ; Great American Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission,
114 Col. 91, 162 P. 2d 413 (1945) ; Alessandro Petrillo Co. v. Marioni, 3 Harr 99
131 AtI. 64 (Del., 1925) ; Burdine's Inc. v. Green, 150 Fla. 361, 7 So. 2d 460 (1942) ;
McCullough v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 155 Kan. 629, 127 P. 2d 467
(1942); Otoe Food Products Co. v. Cruickshank, 141 Neb. 298, 3 N. W. 2d 452
(1942); Schrum v. Catawba Upholstering Co., 214 N. C. 353, 199 S. E. 385 (1938)
(Dictum) ; Johannesen v. Union Iron Works, 97 N. J. L. 569, 117 Atl. 639 (1922) ;
Marland Refining Co. v. Colbaugh, 110 Okl. 238, 238 Pac. 831 (1925) ; Pocahontas
Fuel Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 118 W. Va. 565, 191 S. E. 49
(1937).
14 MD. CODE, art. 101, Section 35-3 (c) (1951).




Standard Method of Appraising Visual Efficiency.1 7 In section I of this
report the term visual acuity is defined as the best acuity obtainable with
ophthalmic lenses and in section IV of the same report the point is
again emphasized: "The best central acuity obtainable with ophthalmic
lenses shall be used in determining the degree of visual efficiency." Dr.
Snell has said that one of the four major faults with the Workmen's
Compensation statutes is a failure to comprehend the importance of, and
necessity for the use of lenses to correct refractive errors.18
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that the courts are split
in opinion as to whether vision shall be measured with or without glasses,
but that leading medical authorities, including the American Medical
Association, are agreed that corrected vision should be the basis for
computing compensation. Glasses are often responsible for the saving
of eyes and sight of individuals in industry and they should now be con-
sidered a protective device rather than a nuisance. 'the proper use of
glasses will increase visual efficiency and thereby aid both the employer
and employee. The employer should not have to pay for a loss of vision,
at least in full, when the employee can be corrected with lenses but the
employer should be required to furnish lenses as part of-the necessary
treatment where there is a change in vision which is in any way connected
with the accident.
The fairest method would be to consider the effect an injury might
have on the need for corrective lenses. If the injury contributes to the
need for wearing lenses, then the degree it contributes can be computed
since an employee is usually already wearing glasses if he needs them or
his present visual acuity is a matter of record. If this data is not on
record, it certainly should be.19 It is believed that a person with visual
acuity of 20/40, or less, should wear glasses. An injury to such an
individual making glasses mandatory should not be compensated. How-
ever, a person with prior visual acuity of better than 20/40 deserves some
compensation for having to wear glasses if such is necessitated by an eye
injury. It is suggested that the exact amount be left in the discretion
of the Industrial Commission with a maximum being set by statute.
The American Medical Association recommends that "industrial
blindness" be defined as an eighty per cent, or more, loss of vision.20
Under this definition an employee with visual acuity of 20/200, or less,
would be compensated as for total loss of vision. The Model Workmen's
1 UKUHN, EYES AND INDUSTRY 330 (1950).
"SNELL, MEDICOLEGAL OPHTHALMOLOGY 273 (1940).
'9 Id. at 274. If the employer does not have this data on record he could secure
it from the person who last examined the eyes of the employee. Such other sources
as the Driver's License Division of the North Carolina Department of Motor
Vehicles might be utilized.
o KuHN, EYES AND INDUSTRY 331 (1950).
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Compensation Law21 as prepared by the United States Department of
Labor, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act,22 and several
state statutes23 have adopted this definition. One writer has recom-
mended that 20/200 be accepted as "industrial blindness" since this
visual acuity has received the endorsement of most authorities.24 The
North Carolina statute 25 defines "industrial blindness" as eighty-five per
cent, or more, loss of vision which would be a visual acuity of 20/230.
Very few modern visual acuity charts have a 20/230 line and all do
have a 20/200 line so it would seem that the definition eighty per cent
loss would be the better and would agree with the authorities in this
field.
The North Carolina statute does not provide for loss of binocular
single vision. The American Medical Association recommends that loss
of binocular single vision be equivalent to the loss of use of one eye.2 0
This recommendation is based upon the fact that an employee can often
be corrected to 20/20 with a heavy lens but he will have "double vision"
with such a correction as the images from the two eyes cannot be fused
because of their difference in size. It is submitted that such an employee
has lost the use of an eye and should be compensated therefor.
In conclusion certain recommendations are made for changes in the
North Carolina statute. These recommendations are based upon statutes
and court decisions from other jurisdictions as well as the opinion of
some of the outstanding medical authorities in the country who have
had wide experience in dealing with eye injuries and resulting visual
conditions. It is believed that the employer and the employee would
benefit from the following changes in the North Carolina statute:
1. The extent of vision loss and compensation for same should be
determined on the basis of corrected vision, before and after the
accident.
2. The definition of "industrial blindness" should be changed to
eighty per cent loss of vision so a visual acuity of 20/200, or less,
with glasses would be compensated as loss of an eye.
3. The statute should require binocular vision and thereby com-
pensate an employee when the two eyes will not function together.
4. The employer should be required to replace glasses which are
broken in an industrial accident. 27
HERBERT L. Toms, JR.
2 1 MODEL WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, U. S. Department of Labor 23(1953).264 STAT. 1271 (1950), 33 U. S. C. § 908 (c) (16) (1952).
ARK. STATS. (1947), § 81-1313 (c) (19) ; F. S. A. § 440.15-3 (p) (1952);
N. Y. WORKMIEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 15-3 (p) (1946).
SNELL, MEDICOLEGAL OPHTHALMOLOGY 201 (1940).
' Note 4 supra. " KunN, EYES AND INDUSTRY 330 (1950).
"r To implement the sugestions made above, it is recommended that:
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(1) N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (t) (Supp. 1955) be amended to read as follows:
Total loss of use of a member shall be equivalent to the loss of such
member. The compensation for partial loss of or for partial loss of use
of a member or for partial loss of hearing shall be such proportion of
the payments above provided for total loss as such partial loss bears to
the total loss.
Loss of binocular single vision or an eighty per centum, or more, loss
of vision in an eye shall be compensated as for loss of an eye. The
compensation for partial loss of vision of an eye shall be such proportion
of the payments provided in subsection (q) as such partial loss bears
to the total loss. Provided; that compensation shall be computed upon
the basis of vision with glasses before the accident and vision with glasses
after the accident. If the employee did not require glasses before the
accident but does require glasses after the accident, then such employee
shall be compensated in the discretion of the Industrial Commission in
an amount not to exceed twenty per centum of the average weekly
wages during ten weeks.
(2) N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25 (Supp. 1955) be amended to include the following
sentence:
The employer shall also replace eyeglasses or any part thereof that may
be broken in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
